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Zusammenfassung
Software, die im automobilen Umfeld eingesetzt wird, hat in der Regel mit si-
cherheitskritischen Systemen zu tun. Aus diesem Grund ist die funktionale Kor-
rektheit der Software von großer Bedeutung. Ein Mittel zum Nachweis derselben
ist die Statische Software Analyse, welche Laufzeitfehler in Software identifizie-
ren kann und ein Standard im Automobilbereich geworden ist. Der kritischste
Laufzeitfehler ist einer, der nur sporadisch auftritt und daher nur sehr schwer
auffindbar und reproduzierbar ist. Eine Ursache für einen solchen Fehler ist
zum Beispiel eine Race Condition. Die Einführung von Multicore Hardware er-
laubt eine tatsächliche parallele Ausführung der Software, was zur Folge hat,
dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit für das Vorkommen einer kritischen Race Condition
zunimmt.
In der vorliegenden Thesis wird MEMICS, ein Ansatz zur Verifikation von
Software, vorgestellt. Um genaue Ergebnisse zu erzielen, arbeitet MEMICS basie-
rend auf Bounded Model Checking, einer Technik aus dem Bereich der formalen
Verifikation. Das interne Modell kann ein Steuergerät aus der Automobil-Branche
inklusive der Hardware-Konfiguration und des dazugehörigen Betriebssystems,
zum Beispiel AUTOSAR oder OSEK, abbilden. Die Verifikations-Einheit in ME-
MICS ist ein neu entwickelter Interval Constraint Solver mit einem integrierten
Speichermodell. MEMICS kann sowohl herkömmliche Laufzeitfehler, wie eine
Division durch Null, als auch nebenläufige Laufzeitfehler, zum Beispiel eine
kritische Race Condition, identifizieren.
v

Abstract
Automotive software is mainly concerned with safety critical systems and the
functional correctness of the software is very important. Thus static software
analysis, being able to detect runtime errors in software, has become a standard
in the automotive domain. The most critical runtime error is one which only
occurs sporadically and is therefore very difficult to detect and reproduce. A
reason for such an error is e. g., a race condition. The introduction of multicore
hardware enables an execution of the software in real parallel. Hence, the risk of
critical race conditions increases.
This thesis introduces the MEMICS software verification approach. In order
to produce precise results, MEMICS works based on the formal verification
technique, bounded model checking. The internal model is able to represent an
entire automotive control unit, including the hardware configuration as well as
real-time operating systems like AUTOSAR and OSEK. The proof engine used
to check the model is a newly developed interval constraint solver with an
embedded memory model. MEMICS is able to detect common runtime errors,
like e. g., a division by zero, as well as concurrent ones, like e. g., a critical race
condition.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Most of the new features – invented in the past few decades – in the automotive
domain are based on embedded systems, the so-called electronic control units
(ECUs). These ECUs are mainly driven by software and are e. g., used in the
following areas:
1. Powertrain Electronics: Most common usage is the engine- and transmis-
sion-control.
2. Chassis Electronics: Monitoring of several safety critical systems, like the
anti-lock braking system (ABS) or the electronic stability program (ESP).
3. Driver Assistance: Management of several assist systems, like a lane assist, an
adaptive cruise control (ACC), or a park assist.
4. Active Safety: Most common feature is the airbag-control.
5. Infotainment Systems: Management of the navigation system, in-car au-
dio/video and so on.
Many of these systems are safety critical, since a malfunction has the potential
to risk human life. Hence, there exists a standard demanding for the functional
correctness of the software used in these ECUs. In order to guarantee a correct
functional behavior of the software one of the techniques postulated by this
standard is the application of static software analysis. In static software analysis
the software is analyzed for all different kind of runtime errors without executing
the software itself. Since the amount of software used in the automotive domain
is growing very fast, the analysis tools must be able to handle up to several
million lines of source code. Therefore, most of them work with some kinds of
abstraction mechanisms. Hence, the consequence is a lack of precision in their
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output. Thus, a manual review of the error candidates is necessary. Since most
of the ECUs control time critical features, their basis is a real-time operating
system implementing several tasks with different priorities. These tasks can
interrupt each other depending on their priority, which results in a concurrent
execution. This concurrent execution can cause one of the most critical types of
runtime errors, the so-called race conditions. Such a race condition is e. g., the
concurrent access to the same hardware resource from two different tasks. These
race conditions usually only occur sporadically and are therefore very difficult
to detect and reproduce. Since an analysis tool has to report any possible race
condition over the entire software, the result is an even bigger number of error
candidates.
It is not only the software, which is evolving very quickly in the automotive
domain, but also is the hardware. The latest innovation in the past few years,
is the introduction of multicore hardware to the automotive domain. This new
hardware allows the software to be truly executed in parallel. Thus, the probabil-
ity for critical race conditions increases strongly. Simultaneously, a real parallel
execution of software results in more possible interleavings of tasks. Hence, with
the strongly increasing amount of error candidates, a manual review is in most
cases not feasible any more.
This thesis introduces Memory Interval Constraint Solving (MEMICS), a new
software verification approach. MEMICS is able to detect common runtime
errors in C/C++ source code, as well as critical concurrent ones. The main goal
of MEMICS is to offer precise results. Therefore, it is working based on formal
verification, using a technique called bounded model checking. To offer even
more precision its internal model is based on an assembly language, instead
of directly on the high-level languages C/C++. In addition this model offers
structures to configure the entire ECU, including the operating system with tasks,
interrupts, and so on, as well as parts of the actual hardware. In order to reduce
the search space, MEMICS is equipped with an efficient unrolling mechanism.
The heart of the approach itself is a newly developed interval constraint solver
with an embedded memory model.
The foundations required in this thesis are located in Chapter 2, including
the related work section. In Chapter 3 the new software verification approach
2
(MEMICS) is introduced in detail. The results of test cases, with an additional
comparison to related state of the art tools, and the according discussion is
located in Chapter 4. An industrial tool-chain is introduced in Chapter 5, in
which MEMICS is used to investigate error candidates produced from industrial
static software analysis tools. The conclusion and future work is located in
Chapter 6.
3

Chapter 2
Foundations
2.1 Automotive Software
Automotive software is often implemented in the programming languages C
[1] or C++ [2]. In this work the term software is restricted to the executable
code and nothing else, like e. g., documentation. The focus of this work is – as
aforementioned – on the functional correctness of the implemented software,
especially on safety critical systems. Since most of these systems have to meet
specific timing constraints, they are mainly implemented in real-time systems.
Real-Time Systems
A real-time system [3, 4] has to meet strict timing requirements. The main dif-
ference between real-time software and other programs is in their definition of
functional correctness. For a common program functional correctness is defined
by the valid result of the implemented function(s). In the case of real-time soft-
ware, functional correctness is defined by the correct result and the amount of
time required to compute it.
Such real-time systems are often built on a task basis, where each task is
scheduled in a defined time slot and has to provide some functionality in defined
deadlines. A common example of such a real-time system is OSEK, which is used
in the automotive domain.
2.1.1 OSEK
In the year 1993 the standard “Open Systems and their Interfaces for the Electron-
ics in Motor Vehicles” (OSEK) [5, 6] was introduced by a consortium composed
5
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of original equipment manufactures (OEMs) from the automotive domain and
Tier 1 suppliers. Since this time, the OSEK-OS has been used as a basis in al-
most any electronic control unit (ECU) in the automotive domain. The standard
provides a lot of features to describe and build task based real-time systems.
Another main standard introduced by the OSEK consortium is the “OSEK Imple-
mentation Language” (OIL) [7]. This implementation language represents the
standard system configuration. It includes the specification of tasks, interrupts,
events, resources and so on. Each of the tasks in OSEK has a certain priority. The
scheduler of OSEK uses this priority for the execution of tasks. The task – waiting
for execution – with the highest priority is selected by the scheduler. In order
to avoid problems like deadlocks or priority inversion, OSEK uses the priority
ceiling protocol [8, 9], for details see [6]. Since this standard is quite old, the
configuration is for single CPUs, only.
2.1.2 AUTOSAR
Ten years after the introduction of OSEK, in the year 2003, the standard “Automo-
tive Open System Architecture” (AUTOSAR) [10] was founded by a consortium
– consisting of almost the same contributors like in the OSEK case. The main
goal of AUTOSAR was to introduce a middleware in between the OS with its
basic software (BSW) and the actual application software (ASW). In addition this
introduction had two major purposes to provide a standard OS and BSW, as well
as to support the migratability, maintainability and replaceability of the ASW.
The OS in AUTOSAR is built on the basis of OSEK. The introduced middleware
is represented by the Run-Time Environment (RTE), which defines the applica-
tion programming interface (API) for the ASW towards the OS and its BSW. In
addition, the AUTOSAR standard introduces the software components (SWC), in
which the ASW has to be partitioned. Such a SWC has to feature defined input-
and output-interfaces. According to the standard it is only allowed to access
global resources (e. g., signals, variables, etc.) via these interfaces using the RTE.
Since the version 4.0 the AUTOSAR standard raises the challenge to tackle the
handling of multicore systems.
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2.2 Software Quality
In the automotive domain the ISO 26262 [11] is a standard regarding functional
safety. The criticality regarding functional safety differs by the impact of a possi-
ble failure. Hence, there exists a classification to ensure the reduction towards a
reasonable risk of failure in relation to its impact, which is called the Automotive
Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) [11]. The determination of the required ASIL – ASIL
A, ASIL B, ASIL C or ASIL D – for a product is achieved by risk analysis. ASIL D
demands the highest safety requirements and ASIL A the lowest. An example for
each ASIL is given in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1. Examples for each ASIL
ASIL Component Risk
A Window Regulator Entrapment of Limbs
B Engine Control Unit Unintentional Acceleration
C Electronic Stability Control
Faulty Triggering of Brake Sys-
tem
D Steering Wheel Faulty Lock while Driving
The aim of the ISO 26262 is to provide a reference process for the product de-
velopment, including mandatory tasks and methods to ensure functional safety
for the acquired ASIL. This reference process is split up into several different
phases starting with the management of functional safety, a concept phase, the
product development phase, until the actual production and operation. Each
phase is again divided into different levels, like e. g., the product development
phase is split into the system-level, the hardware- and the software-level. The
reference process for the software-level is built based on the state of the art
V-model [12, 13] as illustrated in Figure 2.1.
This V-model is defined over several stages starting after the system design
and finally leading towards the integration of a software item into the entire
system and the corresponding tests. In general there exist two phases in the
V-model, the design phase illustrated on the left axis of the V and the test phase
shown on the right axis. The software design phase is split up into the stages:
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Figure 2.1. The Reference Process of the ISO 26262-6: V-Model of the Software Develop-
ment Process. 1
1. Specification of software safety requirements,
2. Software architecture design, and
3. Software unit design and implementation.
The “initiation of the product level development at the software level” starts
before point 1 and guides the entire design phase. After each stage of the design
phase a verification process checks if the requirements of the prior stage are
still covered. In case of unresolvable inconsistencies, the previous stage must be
refined properly. Once the design phase is finished and the software has been
implemented the testing phase starts. The software testing phase is divided into
the stages:
1The numbers refer to the corresponding section in the ISO 26262-6.
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1. Software unit testing,
2. Software integration and testing, and
3. Verification of software safety requirements.
As in the design phase, each step of the testing phase is again concluded by
a verification process. The result of this verification however, does not have
an impact on the direct prior stage, but on the corresponding counterpart in
the design phase. The later a problem occurs during the testing phases, the
longer the entire development process can be delayed, which might have a
direct impact on the product cost.
The ISO 26262 provides at least one list of criteria for each stage of the
Software V, containing several methods regarding the application and verification
of the stage. In addition such a list features the recommendations for each
method according to the required ASIL. For the stage “Software unit design and
implementation” there exist the three lists of criteria: 7, 8, and 9. Regarding
software quality table 9 is the most interesting one. It lists the methods for the
corresponding verification process and is shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2. ISO 26262-6: Table 9 – Methods for the Verification of Software Unit Design
and Implementation (Notation: ++ = highly recommended, + = recommended, and  =
no recommendation for or against)
Methods
ASIL
A B C D
1a Walk-through ++ +  
1b Inspection + ++ ++ ++
1c Semi-formal verification + + ++ ++
1d Formal verification   + +
1e Control flow analysis + + ++ ++
1f Data flow analysis + + ++ ++
1g Static code analysis + ++ ++ ++
1h Semantic code analysis + + + +
9
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The two methods “Walk-through” (1a) and “Inspection” (1b) represent a man-
ual analysis or review. These methods can be applied at source code level as well
as at model level, in case of model-based software development. “Semi-formal
verification”(1c) does not require a complete proof of certain properties. This
method often contains software testing. In contrast, the method “Formal verifi-
cation” (1d) requires a complete proof of a certain property. A common example
for this method is Model Checking, which is introduced in Section 2.4.3. The
methods “Control flow analysis” (1e) and “Data flow analysis” (1f) are described
in Section 2.4.2 and are often part of the methods 1d, 1g and 1h. “Static code
analysis” (1g) – or static software analysis – is introduced in Section 2.4. The
last method “Semantic code analysis” (1h) refers to a mathematical analysis of
source code by use of the method Abstract Interpretation, which is described in
Section 2.4.1. All methods listed in this table do not require the execution of the
source code and are used to identify code defects.
2.3 Code/Software Defects
Code/Software defects – or bugs – are errors in the implementation of software
and result in software behavior violating the specification – e. g., a runtime error.
There exists a wide range of runtime errors from which software can suffer,
including the categories:
1) Arithmetic, 2) Memory, 3) Pointer Arithmetic, and 4) Concurrent.
The common weakness enumeration database (CWE) [14] covers known cat-
egories of code defects. For each defect one can find at least one reference –
including proper documentation of the defect, a source code example and a de-
scription of its impact. Table 2.3 shows those runtime errors, which are relevant
for this work.
The class of arithmetic runtime errors covers defects like e. g., an arithmetic
overflow or a division by zero. The coverage of the classes memory and pointer
arithmetic is straightforward. The last category – concurrent runtime errors –
contains those runtime errors, which are the hardest to detect.
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Table 2.3. List of relevant Runtime Errors for this Work. Details on each Error can be
found in the Common Weakness Enumeration Database (http://cwe.mitre.org)
Class Runtime Error CWE-ID
1) Arithmetic
Division By Zero (Floating Point) 369
Division By Zero (Integer) 369
Signed Overflow 190
Signed Underflow 191
2) Memory
Double Free 415
Invalid Free 590
Null Dereference 476
Pointer To Stack 465
Size-of On Pointers 467
Use After Free 416
3) Pointer Arithmetic
Invalid Range 466
Scaling 468
Subtraction 469
4) Concurrent
Dead Lock 833
Double Lock 667
Lost Update 5672
Missing Synchronization 820
2.3.1 Concurrent Code Defects
The class of concurrent code defects covers the most difficult runtime errors.
Although deadlocks, double locks and missing synchronization are quite simple
to detect – e. g., using pattern matching techniques –, race conditions like e. g., a
lost update are not. The hardest task in the detection of such a race condition is
that in most of the cases the actual error only occurs sporadically and is therefore
very difficult to reproduce.
2Please note, the exact wording on CWE is not “Lost Update”, but the scenario described in the
error defines exactly a Lost Update
11
2. Foundations
2.3.1 Example (A Race Condition in Automotive Software).
A common use case of software in the automotive environment, is e. g., an ECU
used for object recognition. Therefore, the car is equipped with a 360 camera,
which stores the image of one run in a buffer of size n. A common algorithm
to identify objects in such a buffer is the Laplace operator [15]. It computes
the difference of each pixel with its corresponding left and right pixels. If this
difference is not zero, an object has been identified. Figure 2.2 gives an example
of such a buffer for a given image.
Figure 2.2. An Example of an 1D Image-Buffer for Edge-Recognition with the Laplace-
Operator: On top the actual Image is shown, and below the Buffer with the Hex Values of
each Pixel.
The top of the figure shows the image itself and the bottom line represents
the hexadecimal value of each pixel. The algorithm of the Laplace operator for
the pixel i is defined as:
result[i ]= buffer[i1] 2buffer[i ] + buffer[i +1];
Table 2.4 shows the results of the Laplace operator applied to the values from
the image buffer of Figure 2.2. The Laplace operator detects both of the edges
from the object one pixel in advance.
Table 2.4. The Laplace Operator for the Image-Buffer from Figure 2.2.
Buffer[i ] ffffff ffffff ffffff ffffff cfcdcd cfcdcd cfcdcd ffffff
Laplace[i ] 0 0 0 -303232 303232 0 303232 -303232
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An example for an automotive software component implementing this algo-
rithm is shown in Listing 2.1. The component consists of three parts. In the first
part, the image buffer is copied into a local buffer. The actual computation of
the Laplace operator is implemented in the second part. And in the last part the
results are assigned to the output interface of the software component, which
can then be used from other components for further purposes – e. g., to track the
movement of objects. The CPU of the ECU is an AURIX™ TC277T, which lends
itself for parallelization. The tasks for reading the image buffer (readInputs) and
assigning the output interface (writeOutputs) are working on the same core,
since they do not interact with each other. The actual computation of the Laplace
operator is distributed over two separate tasks: worker1 and worker2, where
each of these tasks is running on a separate core. To achieve a proper scheduling
the events data1Ready, data2Ready, worker1Ready and worker2Ready are used.
Once readInputs has read the first half of the buffer, it triggers worker1 and
respectively worker2 at the end. The two workers fire an event once they are
finished, which triggers the output routine.
Listing 2.1. The Source Code of the Software Component Used for Object Recognition 
1 #define nSens ExtInput
2
3 int actors[nSens], sensors[nSens], tmp[nSens];
4 int data1Ready, data2Ready;
5 int worker1Ready, worker2Ready;
6
7 extern void clearEvent(int *event);
8 extern void triggerEvent(int *event);
9
10 int readSensor(int index) {
11 int value;
12 return value;
13 }
14
15 int left(int index, int size) {
16 return (index - 1 + size) % size;
17 }
13
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19 int right(int index, int size) {
20 return (index + 1) % size;
21 }
22
23 void readInputs() {
24 clearEvent(&data1Ready);
25 clearEvent(&data2Ready);
26 int i = 0;
27 for(; i < nSens/2 ; i++)
28 sensors[i] = readSensor(i);
29 triggerEvent(&data1Ready);
30 for (; i < nSens; i++)
31 sensors[i] = readSensor(i);
32 triggerEvent(&data2Ready);
33 }
34
35 void writeOutputs() {
36 waitOnEvent(worker1Ready);
37 waitOnEvent(worker2Ready);
38 int i = 0;
39 for(; i < nSens ; i++)
40 actors[i] = tmp[i];
41 }
42
43 void worker1() {
44 clearEvent(&worker1Ready);
45 waitOnEvent(data1Ready);
46 int i=0;
47 int range = nSens / 2;
48 for(; i < range ; i++)
49 tmp[i] = sensors[left(i, nSens)] - 2 * sensors[i] +
50 sensors[right(i, nSens)];
51 triggerEvent(&worker1Ready);
52 }
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53
54 void worker2() {
55 clearEvent(&worker2Ready);
56 waitOnEvent(data2Ready);
57 int i = (nSens / 2);
58 for(; i < nSens ; i++)
59 tmp[i] = sensors[left(i, nSens)] - 2 * sensors[i] +
60 sensors[right(i, nSens)];
61 triggerEvent(&worker2Ready);
62 } 
On first sight the implementation seems to be well-formed, although it con-
tains a critical race condition. The problem has its origin in the combination of
the software being mapped to the hardware and the definition of the Laplace
operator itself. Since it computes the difference of each pixel with its correspond-
ing neighbors – the left and right one –, the left neighbor of the first pixel in
the buffer is the last pixel in the buffer. But in the current scenario the Laplace
operator for the first pixel is computed once the first half of the image buffer
is read – and if the corresponding processor core is idle. Hence, there exists a
scenario, in which the left pixel still contains the old value. In this case, an edge
can be missed.
This example is used as a running example in this work, whenever an exam-
ple is required for demonstration purposes.
2.4 Code Defect Analysis
In code defect analysis – or program/software analysis – the software is analyzed
for the occurrence of any kind of runtime error, like one of those introduced in
Table 2.3. There exist two different types of analysis approaches: dynamic and
static. In dynamic software analysis the software is checked while executing it
on either a real or a virtual system. Contrary to that the software is analyzed
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without being executed in static software analysis. Please note, for the rest of
this work the term software analysis refers to static software analysis, only.
Software analysis in general is limited by the following two theorems:
Undecidability of the Halting Problem and Rice’s Theorem
The Halting Problem [16] is the decision problem, whether an algorithm
terminates or runs forever. In [16] Alan Turing proved in 1936 that there exists
no algorithm, which is able to solve this problem. The Halting Problem can
be generalized to Rice’s Theorem [17]. Rice’s Theorem states, there exists no
general method able to decide for any algorithm, if it fulfills a certain non-trivial
behavior or not.
Though these problems exist, there is still enough space for software anal-
ysis in practice. Therefore, several strategies have been established in order to
overcome these limitations:
1. Restrict the problem to a finite state space, only.
2. Use of approximation techniques to gain decidability.
3. A combination of point 1. and 2.
These workarounds lead to current techniques used in software analysis, which
are:
1) Abstract Interpretation, 2) Data Flow Analysis, 3) Model Checking, and 4)
Theorem Proving.
2.4.1 Abstract Interpretation
In the approach of Abstract Interpretation [18] the concrete semantics of a pro-
gram is mapped to an abstract semantics. In case this abstraction is sound, the
result of an analysis of the abstraction also holds in the concrete representation.
In addition the analysis of the abstraction might be easier to compute.
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An intuitive example showing the rule of signs is given in [19], which is
illustrated in the following. Let (-1515) * 17 be an instruction. From this in-
struction the abstraction to the domain of signs {+, -} can be derived. The
abstract operations * and - for the abstract values + and - are as follows:
-(+) * (+) ñ (-) * (+) ñ (-).
This leads to the conclusion that -1515 * 17 will be a negative number without
computing its exact value.
The biggest advantage of the abstraction technique is that due to the abstrac-
tion, which usually decreases the complexity of the system to be analyzed, it
allows very large systems to be verified. However, the biggest drawback of this
approach is that with an increasing level of abstraction a loss in precision comes
along. This imprecision raises the risk for possible false positive reports.
2.4.2 Data Flow Analysis
Data Flow Analysis (DFA) [20] is an approach to gather information on the
possible set of values in a program. Therefore, the Control Flow Graph (CFG) is
analyzed on those paths, where the chosen variable occurs.
A common example for DFA is constant propagation [21, 22, 23], which is
used in almost any compiler at a certain optimization level.
2.4.3 Model Checking
In Model Checking (MC) [24, 25] a model – e. g., representing a software program
– is checked for a certain property. A common internal representation of this
model is a Finite State Machine (FSM).
Since the analysis of programs includes nested structures like loops, recursive
function calls, and so on, which may lead to unbounded execution paths, the
problem of deriving a suitable model from a given program code exists. The
concept of Bounded Model Checking addresses this problem.
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Bounded Model Checking
Bounded Model Checking (BMC) [26] is the iterative process, in which a finite
approximation of a model – defined over a fixed execution depth – is checked
whether it satisfies a certain property or not. The process of iteratively check-
ing model approximations and, in case no violation of the property is found,
increased execution depths, is running until either the property holds in one
iteration, or the maximum depth is reached.
There exist several formal approaches in model checking in order to prove
the correctness of a model with respect to a property. Commonly, a model is
given in some automata theoretic notion, i. e., a discrete state transition system,
and the property to be checked is formulated in some logic. Starting from this
setting there are two main streams of model checking: automata oriented and
logic oriented approaches. In the former, the property is translated into an
automaton accepting the complement of the language defined by the property.
The MC problem is then solved by testing the emptiness of the Cartesian product
of the two automata. In case the product is not empty, the model violates the
property. In the logic oriented approach, the model is formulated in the logic of
the property. Here, the MC problem amounts to the satisfiability problem of the
conjunction of the model and the negation of the property formulas. The focus
in this work is on the logic oriented approach, in particular, the use of a decision
procedure for the satisfiability problem for propositional logic (SAT Solving) or
related fragments of first order predicate logic (SMT Solving), which are both
introduced in Section 2.5.
2.4.4 Automated Theorem Proving
Automated Theorem Proving (ATP) [27] defines a technique to prove mathemati-
cal theorems by using computer programs. Although modern theorem provers
are quite powerful, they require human interaction in general and proving/dis-
proving theorems in their logic is usually undecidable. The ATP approach is
therefore prohibitively expensive for practical software verification purposes in
general.
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2.5 The Satisfiability Problem for Propositional Logic
The Satisfiability (SAT) Problem [28, 29] decides for a formula Φ in propositional
logic, whether there exists an assignment ψ satisfying Φ or not. This problem is
decidable, although computational complex since it is NP complete. A decision
procedure for the SAT problem is called SAT-Solver. Such SAT-Solvers usually
work either in a probabilistic or deterministic way. Probabilistic SAT-Solvers
search for a satisfying assignment by guessing truth values for variables. Empir-
ically, they perform well on randomly generated problems, but not so well on
structured problems, like those that occur in the context of software verification.
Deterministic SAT-Solvers, however, are more suitable for solving structured SAT
problems and are therefore considered here.
The most common form of such a formula Φ is the conjunctive normal form
(CNF).
Conjunctive Normal Form
The conjunctive normal form (CNF) is a conjunction of clauses, where a clause
consists either of one literal or the disjunction of several literals. A literal denotes
either the positive or negative representation of a Boolean variable.
A special type of CNF is the Horn formula. Here, the formula itself is also
defined as the conjunction of several Horn clauses. But a Horn clause differs
from a common clause in CNF. It is defined as the disjunction of at least one
negative literal, but including at most one positive literal.
2.5.1 SAT-Solver
A SAT-Solver is a tool, which given an input formula Φ automatically searches
for a solution satisfying Φ. The basic algorithm of almost any common SAT-
Solver was established in [30, 31] back in the years 1960-1962 by M. Davis, G.
Logemann, D. Loveland and H. Putnam. This is the so-called DPLL algorithm,
which is illustrated in Listing 2.2.
Based on this algorithm – including several improvements – the SAT standard
[32] has been introduced in the year 2001. The input to such solvers is a formula
in CNF.
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Listing 2.2. DPLL Algorithm 
function DPLL(Φ)
if all clauses in Φ are satisfied
return Φ= SAT
if one clause is unsatisfiable
return Φ= UNSAT
for each unitclause c PΦ
Φ= propagate(c,Φ)
for each pure literal l PΦ
Φ= assign(l ,Φ)
l = nextLiteral(Φ)
return DPLL(Φ^ l) _ DPLL(Φ^ l) 
Satisfiability of a Formula in CNF
Given a formula in CNF: Φ = ∧
1¤i¤n
ci , where ci = ∨
1¤ j¤m
l j . An assignment ψ
satisfies Φ if the following holds:
ψ |ùΦô (@ci : 1¤ i ¤ n|Dl j : 1¤ j ¤m :ψ(l j )= true)
Due to the conjunction of clauses, each clause must be fulfilled. Hence, there
must exist at least one literal per clause, which is fulfilled.
This leads to the definition of unit propagation, which is a vital part in all
state of the art solvers. A clause is called unit in some partial assignment ψ, if it
contains only one literal, which has not yet been assigned a truth value, or all
literals but one are not true under the assignment ψ. In a satisfying assignment
for the formula Φ, the remaining literal must be evaluated as true.
Unit Propagation
In unit propagation the value of the remaining literal of a unit clause, is prop-
agated over the entire set of clauses in the formula Φ. This propagation might
lead to a new set of unit clauses, which then also have to be fulfilled. The pro-
cess runs until either no further unit propagations are possible, or there exists a
clause, which cannot be satisfied under the current partial assignment.
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There exist approaches where SAT-Solvers are used in software analysis, but
since pure SAT only allows Boolean variables, a lot of abstraction is required,
which directly leads to possible imprecision. However, the SAT problem can be
extended to the so-called Satisfiability Modulo Theories problem.
2.5.2 The Satisfiability Modulo Theories Problem
Commonly, the Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) [33] problem, denotes
the satisfiability problems for quantifier free fragments of first order logic, i. e.,
propositional formulas with predicates instead of propositional variables. The
propositional logic is extended by various theories, like e. g., the theory of lin-
ear integer arithmetic or the theory of reals. There exists a standard library
the Satisfiability Modulo Theories Library (SMT-LIB) [34], which is a database
and reference for any common theory in SMT. The two theories of arrays and
bit-vectors are particularly interesting for software verification, since the com-
bination of these two can be used to represent memory in computers. Some
Model Checking tools like ESBMC [35] and LLBMC [36], which are going to be
introduced in Section 2.7, use SMT-Solvers as logical backends dealing with
those theories.
2.5.3 Interval Constraint Satisfaction Problem
The Interval Constraint Satisfaction Problem (ICSP) [37] is a special category of
the general Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP) [38, 39, 40]. The general CSP
is defined for a set of constraints C containing a fixed number of variables V .
The aim of the CSP is to obtain a set of assignments for the variables in V , which
satisfies the restrictions defined by the constraints in C . The ICSP is defined for
variables of type real or in general variables, which can be defined over intervals.
A very interesting approach in the ICSP domain resulted in the Interval
Constraint Solver HySAT [41] and its successor iSAT. In this approach ICSP and
propositional SAT have been merged for the purpose to validate hybrid systems.
Therefore, the DPLL algorithm has been extended towards interval constraint
propagation. In [42] HySAT was used as an early backend for the verification
of common runtime errors. This approach performed quite well, when using
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simple benchmarks for the proof of concept. Although on bigger benchmarks –
with only several hundred lines of code – it did not scale any more. The main
bottleneck in this approach had been the logical representation of the physical
memory in combination with the unrolling procedure of HySAT. In HySAT the
entire model is transformed into a logical formula for each iteration. Therefore,
also the memory representation inside the model has to be transformed in each
step, resulting in a huge model.
2.6 Compiler Infrastructure
The compiler infrastructure [43, 44] is a framework with which the source code
of a program can be transformed into an executable binary. In general such an
infrastructure is built on the combination of a Frontend, a Middleend and a
Backend. The Frontend of a compiler framework transforms the input source
code into the internal intermediate representation – the language model. In
the Middleend – depending on the configuration – several optimizations can
be applied like e. g., optimization for runtime, resource usage, and so on. The
Backend is then used to generate the actual executable for a specific target
machine.
2.6.1 Low Level Virtual Machine – LLVM
The “Low Level Virtual Machine” (LLVM) [45] is a compiler infrastructure, which
has become more and more popular over the last few years. The heart of LLVM
is its intermediate representation, which is going to be introduced in Subsec-
tion 2.6.1.1. Figure 2.3 shows the overall workflow of LLVM.
The frontend of LLVM is its actual compiler engine – CLANG [46]. It trans-
forms the input source code, supporting the programming languages C, C++
and Objective-C, into the LLVM intermediate representation. Clang however, is
actually a stand-alone compiler, which has the middle- and backend integrated.
2.6.1.1 LLVM Intermediate Representation (IR)
The intermediate representation (IR) [47] of LLVM consists of two parts: 1) The
Virtual Instruction Set and 2) The Type System. The virtual machine behind these
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Figure 2.3. The Workflow of LLVM: From Source-Code towards Binary Machine-Code
two is based on MIPS [48] – a RISC computer architecture, which is introduced
in Section 2.6.2. The root representation of the C/C++ source code inside the
LLVM IR is the LLVM::Module. The module defines the data layout of the chosen
target. This includes the type of endianess, as well as the alignment of data
for all basic types according to its specific bit widths. In addition the module
contains the entire list of global variables. The LLVM::Function represents an
actual function of the source code. Inside an LLVM:Module all functions are
stored in a list. Each function has a specified return value and a fixed number of
arguments. A function is divided into several LLVM::BasisBlocks. The basic block
is a sequence of instructions inside LLVM, where the last instruction is either a
branch instruction or a terminator instruction.
The Virtual Instruction Set
The LLVM Virtual Instruction Set is based on the MIPS assembly language. In-
stead of a fixed register set, the LLVM virtual machine is working on an infinite
set of virtual registers. The reason therefor is the need for a unique specification,
which is consistent over all instructions. This unique specification is called static
single assignment form.
Static Single Assignment From
In static single assignment (SSA) [49, 50] form each variable must only be as-
signed once. This ensures a uniqueness of the value of each variable. Therefore,
each variable of a statement is extended by an index. In case variable assign-
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ments are not unique due to branches, so-called phi functions (nodes) are
introduced. The phi function determines, which value a variable must have,
according to the chosen branch.
In Table 2.5 an example for the transformation of some C statements into
SSA form is shown.
Table 2.5. An Example for the Transformation of C Statements into Static Single Assign-
ment Form
Original C-Statement SSA Statement
1. x = x * (y - z); x1 = x0 * (y0 - z0);
2. if (z != 0) if (z0 != 0)
3. x = m / z; x2 = m0 / z0;
4. else else
5. x = 0; x3 = 0;
6. n = x * 2t
x4 = φ(x2, x3);
n0 = x4 * 2t
The Type System
The type system of LLVM is independent of the input source language. It features
the common types: void, bool, integers of type signed and unsigned with a bit-
width from 8 to 64, as well as single and double precision floating point values.
Although LLVM is based on an assembly like language, it still features high-level
types, like e. g., arrays, bit vectors and structures.
2.6.1 Example (LLVM IR).
Listing 2.3 shows the LLVM IR for the function worker1 from the previous Exam-
ple 2.3.1. The function is, as aforementioned, divided into several basic blocks.
These blocks are labeled: entry, for.cond, for.body, for.inc, and for.end. In
the first block, the corresponding ready signal (worker1Ready) of the function
is cleared and the function waits for the signal data1Ready. The block termi-
nates with an unconditional branch into the block for.cond. In this block the
loop condition is evaluated and depending on the result, the next branch is
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either for.body or for.end. The actual computation of the Laplace operator
resides inside the block for.body. This block branches without any condition
into the block for.inc. In this block the loop counter is incremented and it
terminates with a branch towards for.cond. Inside the last block for.end the
signal worker1Ready is triggered and it terminates with the return of type void.
Listing 2.3. The LLVM Intermediate Representation for the Function worker1() of Exam-
ple 2.3.1. 
1 define void @worker1() nounwind {
2 entry:
3 %i = alloca i32, align 4
4 %range = alloca i32, align 4
5 call void @clearEvent(i32* @worker1Ready)
6 %0 = load i32* @data1Ready, align 4
7 call void @waintOnEvent(i32 %0)
8 store i32 0, i32* %i, align 4
9 store i32 10, i32* %range, align 4
10 br label %for.cond
11
12 for.cond:
13 %1 = load i32* %i, align 4
14 %2 = load i32* %range, align 4
15 %cmp = icmp slt i32 %1, %2
16 br i1 %cmp, label %for.body, label %for.end
17
18 for.body:
19 %3 = load i32* %i, align 4
20 %call1 = call i32 @left(i32 %3, i32 20)
21 %arrayidx = getelementptr inbounds [20 x i32]* @sensors,
22 i32 0, i32 %call1
23 %4 = load i32* %arrayidx, align 4
24 %5 = load i32* %i, align 4
25 %arrayidx2 = getelementptr inbounds [20 x i32]* @sensors,
26 i32 0, i32 %5
27 %6 = load i32* %arrayidx2, align 4
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28 %mul = mul nsw i32 2, %6
29 %sub = sub nsw i32 %4, %mul
30 %7 = load i32* %i, align 4
31 %call3 = call i32 @right(i32 %7, i32 20)
32 %arrayidx4 = getelementptr inbounds [20 x i32]* @sensors,
33 i32 0, i32 %call3
34 %8 = load i32* %arrayidx4, align 4
35 %add = add nsw i32 %sub, %8
36 %9 = load i32* %i, align 4
37 %arrayidx5 = getelementptr inbounds [20 x i32]* @tmp,
38 i32 0, i32 %9
39 store i32 %add, i32* %arrayidx5, align 4
40 br label %for.inc
41
42 for.inc:
43 %10 = load i32* %i, align 4
44 %inc = add nsw i32 %10, 1
45 store i32 %inc, i32* %i, align 4
46 br label %for.cond
47
48 for.end:
49 call void @triggerEvent(i32* @worker1Ready)
50 ret void
51 } 
Although LLVM is based on an assembly language, the fact it still features
high-level types like arrays, phi-nodes, pointers, and so on, raises some chal-
lenges when it comes to software analysis.
2.6.2 MIPS Assembly
The MIPS [48] architecture is part of the RISC [51] family and widely used in the
field of embedded systems. RISC – Reduced Instruction Set Computer – is one
of two possible design “philosophies” of micro-processors. Contrary to the CISC
[52] family – Complex Instruction Set Computer –, the instruction set featured
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in RISC is quite small and simple. This lends itself for pipelining and allows high
cycle rates. On the other hand, due to the simple chip design the RISC chips are
usually cheaper. This fact is important, when it comes to the evaluation of the
product cost.
Compared to LLVM, MIPS only features the basic types signed- and unsigned-
integer, as well as single- and double-precision floating point. Hence, the diffi-
culties in handling the high-level LLVM type system do not exist.
2.6.2 Example (MIPS Assembly Code of Example 2.3.1).
Listing 2.4 shows the function worker1 of Example 2.3.1 transformed into the
MIPS assembly language. Since LLVM is based on MIPS the LLVM IR shown in
Listing 2.3 does not differ much from the actual assembly code. The basic block
structure is still valid in Listing 2.4. But the need for handling pointers differently
from other values is gone, entirely.
Listing 2.4. MIPS Assembly Code of the Function worker1 from Example 2.3.1 
1 worker1
2 .set noreorder
3 .set nomacro
4
5 #BB7_0 # %entry
6 addiu $sp, $sp, -56
7 sw $ra, 52($sp)
8 addiu $2, $gp, %got(worker1Ready)
9 addiu $3, $gp, %got(data1Ready)
10 lw $4, 0($2)
11 lw $2, 0($3)
12 sw $2, 40($sp)
13 jal clearEvent
14 nop
15 lw $2, 40($sp)
16 lw $4, 0($2)
17 jal waitOnEvent
18 nop
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19 addiu $3, $zero, 2
20 sw $zero, 48($sp)
21 sw $3, 44($sp)
22 sw $2, 36($sp)
23
24 $BB7_1 # %for.cond
25 lw $2, 48($sp)
26 lw $3, 44($sp)
27 slt $2, $2, $3
28 beq $2, $zero, $BB7_4
29 nop
30 j $BB7_2
31 nop
32
33 $BB7_2 # %for.body
34 lw $4, 48($sp)
35 addiu $2, $zero, 4
36 addu $5, $zero, $2
37 sw $2, 32($sp)
38 jal left
39 nop
40 addiu $4, $gp, %got(sensors)
41 lw $5, 48($sp)
42 sll $2, $2, 2
43 lw $4, 0($4)
44 sll $3, $5, 2
45 addu $2, $4, $2
46 addu $3, $4, $3
47 lw $3, 0($3)
48 lw $2, 0($2)
49 sw $4, 28($sp)
50 addu $4, $zero, $5
51 lw $5, 32($sp)
52 sw $2, 24($sp)
53 sw $3, 20($sp)
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54 jal right
55 nop
56 sll $2, $2, 2
57 lw $3, 20($sp)
58 sll $3, $3, 1
59 addiu $4, $gp, %got(tmp)
60 lw $5, 28($sp)
61 addu $2, $5, $2
62 lw $6, 48($sp)
63 lw $2, 0($2)
64 lw $7, 24($sp)
65 subu $3, $7, $3
66 lw $4, 0($4)
67 sll $6, $6, 2
68 addu $2, $3, $2
69 addu $3, $4, $6
70 sw $2, 0($3)
71
72 #BB7_3 # %for.inc
73 lw $2, 48($sp)
74 addiu $2, $2, 1
75 sw $2, 48($sp)
76 j $BB7_1
77 nop
78
79 $BB7_4 # %for.end
80 addiu $2, $gp, %got(worker1Ready)
81 lw $4, 0($2)
82 jal triggerEvent
83 nop
84 lw $ra, 52($sp)
85 addiu $sp, $sp, 56
86 jr $ra
87 nop 
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The sequence for the calculation of the address data1Ready in the first basic
block is a good example for showing the differences between the LLVM IR and
MIPS assembly, as shown in Table 2.6. The LLVM IR representation is only one
single instruction, whereas in MIPS assembly five instructions are required. In
the first instruction the global memory address of data1Ready is retrieved from
the MIPS internal global offset table (got) and assigned to register $2. The second
instruction loads the actual memory position into register $2. In the next step
this memory position is stored into the function local stack, since the assembly
instruction in line 13 leads to a jump into the function clearEvent. After the
return from this call, the next instruction reloads the memory position into
register $2. And finally the actual value of data1Ready is assigned to register $4.
At first sight the LLVM IR looks much more efficient, but the MIPS assembly
represents the “real world”. In case of sequential execution, the LLVM IR might
be sufficient to detect runtime errors. A tool working directly on the LLVM IR
however, in case of concurrent execution, cannot identify all kind of concurrent
runtime errors, because not all possible interleavings are considered.
Table 2.6. LLVM IR vs MIPS assembly: Differences between the two Representations of
Source Code.
Line LLVM IR Line MIPS Assembly
9 addiu $3, $gp, %got(data1Ready)
11 lw $2, 0($3)
6 %0 = load i32* @data1Ready, 12 sw $2, 40($sp)
align 4 15 lw $2, 40($sp)
16 lw $4, 0($2)
2.7 Related Work
This section introduces related software analysis tools. The main focus is on the
techniques used in these approaches, including a short description of the corre-
sponding workflow. In addition, a list of the supported runtime errors which are
analyzed is given. Please note, since these lists are based on the corresponding
author’s (authors’) tool publications, the lists might not be complete nor entirely
correct.
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2.7.1 Blast
The Berkeley Lazy Abstraction Software Verification Tool BLAST [53] was first in-
troduced in 2002. It works based on model checking combined with the counter
example guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR) [54] approach. The abstraction
techniques used in BLAST are the so-called lazy predicate abstraction [55] and
interpolation-based predicate discovery [56]. In this case the term predicate is
used for a path condition.
The workflow of the main algorithm in BLAST is illustrated in the following:
1. Transformation of the source code into internal control flow automata (CFA),
one for each function.
2. Construction of abstract reachability trees (ART) – based on the CFA –, where
the reachability of a node is denoted by the set of constraints on the current
path.
3. CEGAR analysis, which checks the feasibility of an error path:
(a) Path is feasible ñ an error has been identified, or
(b) path is not feasible, start predicate discovery.
4. Predicate discovery is used to find refinement predicates in order to eliminate
infeasible errors from the ART(s).
5. Refinement of the ART(s), according to the generated predicates from 4.
6. Continue at 3.
Due to the abstraction, BLAST is able to handle programs with around 50000
lines of code.
Covered Runtime Errors
Since BLAST was designed as a general purpose model checker, there are no
common C/C++ runtime errors hard encoded, although the basic checks imple-
mented in BLAST are:
 reachability checking
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 assertion checking
 temporal safety specifications
Limitations
Some of the functions in BLAST may be uninterpreted, which can lead to impre-
cision in the analysis results. In case of runtime error coverage, BLAST does not
support the check for integer overflows. BLAST has no support for task-based
OS like AUTOSAR/OSEK.
2.7.2 CBMC
CBMC – Bounded Model Checking for ANSI-C – [57] is a software analysis tool,
which was introduced in 2004. The early versions of CBMC used pure SAT-
logic and MINISAT [58] as the corresponding backend solver. Since 2009 CBMC
supports the bit-vector theory of the SMT-Lib, with the backend SMT-Solvers:
Boolector [59], MathSAT [60], and Z3 [61].
The workflow of the main procedure of CBMC is defined as:
1. Preprocessing of the input source code.
2. Transformation and replacement of C statements –like e. g., loops, recursive
functions, etc. – into suitable representations (for details refer to Section 2.1
of [57])
3. Generation of a logic formula.
4. Conversion of this formula into CNF, by adding auxiliary variables.
5. Pass the formula to the SMT-Solver and check it for Satisfiability.
Covered Runtime Errors
CBMC can detect the following runtime errors:
 array bounds
 division by zero
32
2.7. Related Work
 pointer safety
 signed/unsigned over- and underflows
 floating point NaN check
 reachability checking
 assertion checking
Limitations
CBMC has no support for task-based OS like AUTOSAR/OSEK.
2.7.3 SATABS
The SATABS [62] software analysis tool, is embedded into the GUI of CBMC.
SATABS is the first approach to support ANSI-C fundamentals like arrays and
unions. In addition to simple BMC like in CBMC, SATABS is working based on
predicate abstraction and refinement.
The main workflow of SATABS is described in the following:
1. Generation of an abstract model by usage of SAT-based Boolean quantifica-
tion, as described in [63].
2. Transformation of the formula defining this model into CNF.
3. It passes the abstract model to one of the supported backend model checkers:
e. g., MOPED [64], SPIN [65], or NuSMV [66].
4. In case the model checker returns a counterexample, SATABS has to check,
whether it is spurious, or not. Therefore, it generates a SAT instance for the
counterexample and checks it for satisfiability:
(a) In case of satisfiability Ñ SATABS can return an error trace.
(b) Otherwise, the abstract model has to be refined, and the process contin-
ues.
For in depth details on this workflow, please see [62, 67, 68, 69].
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Covered Runtime Errors
SATABS can detect the following runtime errors:
 array bounds (buffer overflows)
 pointer safety
 exceptions
 control-flow oriented user-specified assertions.
Limitations
SATABS does not support task-based OS like AUTOSAR/OSEK.
2.7.4 ESBMC
The ESBMC [35] software analysis tool was introduced in 2009. ESBMC is basi-
cally built on the base of CBMC to generate the properties to verify. However,
ESBMC has extended CBMC to use more SMT theories as in the original ap-
proach. In addition, ESBMC features a primitive scheduling model in order to
handle POSIX threads. ESMBC is supporting the two SMT-Solvers Boolector and
Z3.
The workflow of ESBMC is described in the following:
1. CBMC preprocessing until step 4. as described in Section 2.7.2.
2. Choose the selected SMT-Solver.
3. Derive the logic formula via conversion of the CBMC constraints and proper-
ties.
4. Pass the formula to the SMT-Solver and check it for Satisfiability.
In case of concurrent analysis for POSIX, ESBMC is generating a reachability tree
and checking all possible interleavings in this tree.
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Covered Runtime Errors
ESBMC can detect the following runtime errors:
 arithmetic under- and overflow
 pointer safety
 memory leaks
 array bounds
 atomicity and order violations
 deadlock
 data race
Limitations
ESMBC has no support for task-based OS like AUTOSAR/OSEK.
2.7.5 LLBMC
LLBMC [36], the Low Level Bounded Model Checker is a software analysis tool,
which is working on LLVM. The verification Backends used in LLBMC are the
SMT-Solver Boolector, working on the SMT-Lib category bit-vector, and the
SMT-Solver STP [70], a constraint solver for program analysis tools.
The main workflow of LLBMC is the following:
1. Compilation of the input source code into the LLVM IR.
2. Generate SMT logic formulas based on the LLVM IR, containing:
(a) The entire memory management, and
(b) all assumptions about possible errors.
3. Let the logical backend check if any of the error assumptions holds.
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Covered Runtime Errors
LLBMC can detect the following runtime errors:
 Integer overflow
 Division by zero
 Invalid bit shift
 Illegal memory access (array index out of bound, illegal pointer access, etc.)
 Invalid free
 Double free
 User-customizable checks (via __llbmc_assume / __llbmc_assert)
Limitations
Though LLBMC supports the entire C language family, it does not feature float-
ing point types. Moreover LLBMC does not support a task-based OS like AU-
TOSAR/OSEK. In addition, there are currently no checks for concurrent issues
available.
2.7.6 Predator
Predator [71] has been introduced in 2011. It is a software analysis tool, built for
the verification of sequential C code, with a specialization on dynamic linked
data structure. In the first version, Predator used separation logic in combination
with inductive predicates. Later, the separation logic was replaced by a graph-
based representation in order to benefit from the massive set of graph-based
algorithms. The latest redesign of its internal representation lead to symbolic
memory graphs (SMGs).
The overall workflow of Predator is described in the following:
1. Creation of a Control Flow Graph (CFG) for the input C code.
2. Iterative generation of sets of SMGs for all basic blocks of the CFG.
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3. Analyze the SMGs with the help of an abstraction- and a join-algorithm. For
details on these two algorithms see [72].
4. In case of no error and not all configurations have been checked, go to 2.
Covered Runtime Errors
Predator is – according to the authors – able to detect the following runtime
errors:
 null dereferences
 double deletion
 memory leakage
Limitations
As aforementioned, Predator is built for sequential C code and is therefore not
able to identify critical race conditions. This also means that Predator is not able
to handle task-based OS like AUTOSAR/OSEK. In addition it also does not seem
to be able to handle arithmetic runtime errors, like e. g., a division by zero.
2.7.7 Threader
The software analysis tool Threader [73] has been introduced in 2011. The main
purpose of Threader is the verification of multi-threaded programs. It is working
according to the CEGAR [54] technique. Threader uses the CIL framework [74]
to generate its internal transition system including specific properties, which
defines constraints over the shared variables in the program.
The workflow of Threader is described in the following:
1. Generation of the internal transition system via CIL.
2. Check the transition system for the reachability of an error state.
(a) In case no error state is reachable Ñ Abstraction is safe.
(b) Otherwise, generate a set of Horn clauses representing the path to the
error.
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3. Pass Horn clauses to Horn-Solver and check for Satisfiability:
(a) In case the clauses are satisfiable Ñ error has been found (including
counterexample)
(b) Otherwise, candidate was a false-positive Ñ refinement of the abstrac-
tion model
4. Continue with 2.
Covered Runtime Errors
Threader is able to verify multi-threaded programs. From the documentation it
decides over the reachability of either assertions or specified error-labels.
Limitations
There is no support for recursive functions, since Threader’s preprocessing en-
gine uses function inlining. Though Threader supports concurrent programs, it
does not feature task-based OS like AUTOSAR/OSEK. In addition it seems that
threader is not supporting the detection of critical race conditions.
2.8 Related Industrial Tools
This section introduces the three industrial static analysis tools: Astrée, Bauhaus
and Polyspace, which are working based on abstract interpretation and pattern
matching.
2.8.1 Astrée
The Astrée analyzer [75, 76, 77, 78] was introduced in 2003 at the Laboratoire
d’Informatique of the École Normale Supérieur. Astrée is a static software analy-
sis tool, which is working based on abstract interpretation. For details on those
abstraction techniques, please refer to [78]. The workflow of Astrée is described
in the following:
1. Generation of the intermediate representation by a compiler-like front-end.
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2. Independent analysis in order to gather relevant informations, e. g., variable
dependencies.
3. Generation of invariants based on the criteria assembled in step 2.
4. Checking of the invariants using several abstract domains [79] and error
reporting.
Though this description looks quite easy, Astrée features many different op-
tions, which all must be manually enabled and most of them require advanced
knowledge.
2.8.2 Bauhaus
The Bauhaus [80] Tool Suite is a combination of several functionalities, where
the main purpose is to cover and guide the entire development process. In order
to analyze large or even huge industrial projects, the implemented features are
working based on approximative techniques. This can lead to large numbers of
false positive reports, which have to be checked by a manual review. The features
covered by Bauhaus are:
 architectural checks
 code clone detection
 code style checks (Misra C/C++ [81])
 several code metrics
 dead code detection
 and many more
In addition there exists experimental work for the detection of data races [82].
2.8.3 Polyspace
Polyspace [83] is a static software analysis tool for C/C++ source code of the
Mathworks group. The latest version of Polyspace is actually divided into two
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tools: the Polyspace Bug Finder™and the Polyspace Code Prover™. The first
one is a basic static software analysis tool, which is able to identify several
runtime errors. A detailed list of runtime errors can be found on the Polyspace
website. The second one is using abstract interpretation and also static analysis
to prove the absence of the runtime errors: like e. g., overflow, division by zero,
out-of-bounds array access.
Though Polyspace is able to handle a large amount of source code, it still
produces error candidates, which it cannot verify. These candidates have to be
checked in a manual review.
Although some of the academic software analysis tools are already capable of
handling concurrent software, none of them is able to identify race conditions
in an automotive system based on AUTOSAR or OSEK. On the other hand, the
industrial tool Bauhaus is in its experimental race detection engine able to tackle
this problem, but the amount of resulting error candidates is too big for a manual
review.
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The MEMICS Software Verification
Approach
The Memory Interval Constraint Solving (MEMICS) [84, 85, 86] software ver-
ification approach is able to detect a wide range of runtime errors in C/C++
software from a division by zero up to critical race conditions. In Figure 3.1 the
architectural overview of MEMICS is illustrated.
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Figure 3.1. Overview of the MEMICS Software Verification Approach
In the first step of the process, MEMICS transforms the source code using
the LLVM compiler infrastructure into its own model. In the actual verification
process the internal model is unrolled step by step and transformed into a logic
formula in SSA form. This formula is then passed to the solver of MEMICS, which
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checks, whether the formula and respectively the underlying software suffers
from any runtime error. The process continues until: the entire source code is
proven to be free of any runtime error, an error is detected or a timeout occurred.
Please note that the current focus of runtime error detection in MEMICS is on
those listed in Table 2.3, although the general approach can easily be extended
by other error categories.
The main focus of MEMICS is the identification of runtime errors in auto-
motive software, in particular the detection and/or verification of critical race
conditions. This is of high relevance, since the introduction of multicore hard-
ware to the automotive domain greatly increases the risk for potential race
conditions.
3.1 The MEMICS Frontend
The MEMICS Frontend generates the MEMICS Model from the input C/C++
source code. This generation process, shown in Figure 3.2, is embedded into the
LLVM compiler infrastructure. For details on LLVM, see Section 2.6.1. The process
is split into three different steps. First, CLANG is used to compile the input C/C++
source code into the LLVM IR. Please note that all optimizations are disabled in
the compile process per default. The reason is, compiler optimizations are used
to optimize the executable code, like e. g., for runtime. But these optimizations
can have an impact on the behavior of the software itself. The last step is the
actual generation of the MEMICS Model.
In Section 2.6.1 it has been stated that, though the LLVM IR is based on
MIPS assembly, it still contains high-level language features, like e. g., pointers.
The MEMICS Model, which is introduced in detail in Section 3.2, is built based
directly on MIPS assembly. In order to properly generate this model out of
the LLVM IR, a new target code generating backend has been embedded into
LLVM. This backend is built based on the MIPS backend of LLVM, with some
minor modifications in the target specific lowering rules. Also, instead of creating
a plain assembly instruction, the backend builds a MEMICS instruction – as
defined in Section 3.2.3 – and adds it to the model.
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Figure 3.2. Overview of the Frontend of the MEMICS Software Verification Approach
3.2 The MEMICS Model
The MEMICS Model is defined as a finite state machine M = < S,T >, with a set
of states S = {s1, . . . , sn} and a set of transitions T = {t1, . . . , tm}. A transition ti P T
is defined as a 4-tuple: < si , a,c, s1i >, where si describes the current state of the
model, a is the actual action of a MIPS instruction, c is an optional condition -
e. g., required for branch instructions - and s1i is the successor state of the model.
The four general MEMICS instructions types are shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1. Logic Representation of the four General Instruction Types inside the MEMICS
Model.
Instruction Type Logic Definition Description
basic si Ñ a^ s1i
The current state si implies the exe-
cution of instruction a and the suc-
cessor state s1i .
conditional si ^ cÑ a^ s1i
The current state si and the condi-
tion c imply the execution of instruc-
tion a and the successor state s1i .
43
3. The MEMICS Software Verification Approach
conditional jump si ^ cÑ s1i
The current state si and the condi-
tion c imply the successor state s1i .
unconditional jump si Ñ s1i
An unconditional jump, where the
current state si implies the successor
state s1i .
Before the syntax of the MEMICS Model and the entire instruction set can
be introduced, the virtual CPU and the corresponding memory modeling inside
MEMICS have to be described.
3.2.1 The virtual CPU and Memory of the MEMICS Model
The virtual CPU of the model supports an arbitrary number of processor cores,
where each core consists of all the registers featured by the MIPS assembly lan-
guage. This includes 32 common integer registers in two’s complement, e. g., the
global pointer, return address and stack pointer registers, as well as 32 floating
point registers. Though MEMICS does not require a separate co-processor for
floating point operations, all floating point instructions in MEMICS are still in
line with the MIPS assembly language. Therefore, the system still has to transfer
data between integer and floating point registers, if needed.
The system memory of MEMICS is currently modeled by a byte-sized array
of dynamic range. Since the default endianess of the MIPS assembly backend
of LLVM is big endian, the current implementation of the memory model fea-
tured in MEMICS is big endian, too. The alignment of the memory model is
per default configured to four byte. Both, the alignment and the endianess are
configurable in order to meet any kind of target architecture required by the user.
The maximum size of the modeled memory is configurable. The adjustment of
the internal memory is illustrated in Figure 3.3. The first memory block repre-
global offset table stack memory heap memory ...static memory
Figure 3.3. The Memory Adjustment of the internal Memory modeled in MEMICS
sents the global offset table, in which the base addresses of all global variables
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and functions are stored. The static memory block covers the actual memory
location for each global variable. Function local memory - the stack - is placed
in the stack memory block. The default stack size of a function can either be
computed by the LLVM MEMICS backend or passed to MEMICS via a configu-
ration file. In the last block, all heap memory is dynamically allocated. Initially
this block is empty. If MEMICS runs out of memory during a verification run,
the corresponding exception is thrown.
3.2.2 Syntax of the MEMICS Model
The syntactical definition of the MEMICS Model – the Intermediate Representa-
tion (IR) – is the encoding of a program into the Formula introduced in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2. Syntax of the MEMICS Model
Model
Formula ::= Formula ^ Formula
∥ Instruction
Instruction ::= Condition Ñ Action
∥ Action
∥ Condition
Condition
Condition ::= bool(Condition, Condition)
∥ CondExpr
CondExpr ::= rel (Reg, Reg)
∥ Reg
∥  (CondExpr)
Action
Action ::= Action ^ Action
∥ ActExpr
ActExpr ::= Reg’ := Expr
∥ load(Reg’, memAdr(Reg, Reg), Reg)
∥ store(Reg, memAdr(Reg, Reg), Reg)
∥ memcpy(Reg, Reg, Reg)
∥ memset(Reg, Reg, Reg)
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Expr ::= calloc(Reg, Reg)
∥ memory(Reg)
∥ binary(Reg, Reg)
∥ cast(Reg)
∥ unary(Reg)
Operators
rel ::= compare_float
∥ compare_signed
∥ compare_unsigned
binary ::= binary_float
∥ binary_signed
∥ binary_unsigned
∥ bit
∥ rel
bit ::= and ∥ or ∥ xor ∥ sl ∥ sr
bool ::= ^ ∥ _ ∥Ñ ∥Ø
cast ::= foat2float ∥ float2int ∥ int2float
∥ int2int
load ::= lb ∥ lbu ∥ lh ∥ lhu ∥ lw ∥ ld
memory ::= malloc ∥ free ∥ new ∥ delete
store ::= sb ∥ sh ∥ sw ∥ sd
unary ::= unary_float
∥ unary_signed
∥ unary_unsigned
Float Operators
binary_float ::= addF ∥ subF ∥ mulF ∥ divF
∥ powF ∥ nrootF ∥ minF ∥ maxF
compare_float ::= eqF ∥ neqF ∥ sltF ∥ sleqF
∥ sgtF ∥ sgeqF
unary_float ::= abF ∥ expF ∥ logF ∥ sqrtF
∥ cosF ∥ sinF ∥ tanF
∥ arccosF ∥ arcsinF ∥ arctanF
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Signed Operators
binary_signed ::= add ∥ sub ∥ mul ∥ div
∥ pow ∥ nroot ∥ min ∥ max
compare_signed ::= eq ∥ neq ∥ slt ∥ sleq ∥ sgt ∥ sgeq
unary_signed ::= ab ∥ exp ∥ log ∥ sqrt ∥ cos ∥ sin
∥ tan ∥ arccos ∥ arcsin ∥ arctan
Unsigned Operators
binary_unsigned ::= addU ∥ subU ∥ mulU ∥ divU
∥ powU ∥ nrootU ∥ minU ∥ maxU
compare_unsigned ::= eqU ∥ neqU ∥ sltU ∥ sleqU
∥ sgtU ∥ sgeqU
unary_unsigned ::= expU ∥ logU ∥ sqrtU
∥ cosU ∥ sinU ∥ tanU
∥ arccosU ∥ arcsinU ∥ arctanU
A Reg represents a register of the internal virtual machine, which has been
introduced in Section 3.2.1. Since such a register, which can either be a floating-
point register or an integer register, contains a simple bit-vector, the operator
itself contains the actual encoding for interpreting its value. Therefore, there
exist three different operators: one operator for floating-point operations, one
for signed integer operations and one for unsigned integer operations. All the
corresponding instructions are introduced in Section 3.2.3. The prime or next op-
erator (1) defines the “next” state of the current register. It is required by MEMICS
unrolling procedure, which is introduced in Section 3.4.1, in order to ensure a
proper SSA encoding of the formula.
Please note that the operators: bit, binary, compare, and unary can also be
represented by their equivalent mathematical symbol, defined as:
op(Reg, Reg)  (Reg math(op) Reg).
E. g., the instruction a1 := add(b,c) is equivalent to the instruction: a1 := b+c . In
case the operator is of type floating-point the mathematical operator must still
carry this information, e. g., addF  +F and addU  +U.
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3.2.3 The MEMICS Instruction Set
The instruction set of MEMICS is, as aforementioned, based on the MIPS in-
struction set. This section introduces all instructions covered by MEMICS. The
actual instruction, corresponding to an actual machine instruction, is either
an assignment or a relation – as shown in Table 3.1 the action a or the condi-
tion c. This section is divided into the definitions of the arithmetic instructions
(Subsection 3.2.3.1), the memory instructions (Subsection 3.2.3.2), the type rel-
evant instructions (Subsection 3.2.3.3) and the synchronization instructions
(Subsection 3.2.3.4).
All of the instructions shown in this section are atomic in the current imple-
mentation of MEMICS. Therefore, they are not interruptable.
3.2.3.1 Arithmetic Instructions
The block of arithmetic instructions is the biggest one inside the MEMICS in-
struction set. Arithmetic wise, MEMICS supports floating point, signed and
unsigned integer, as well as bitwise integer instructions. Since the integer regis-
ters of a common MIPS machine are in tow’s complement, the interpretation of
the encoding is directly handled in the instruction. Therefore, the floating point,
signed integer and unsigned integer instructions only differ in the interpreta-
tion of the value inside a register. Due to this fact, this section only covers the
signed integer and bitwise integer instructions. The definitions for floating point
and unsigned integer instructions are located in the Appendix in Table B.1 and
Table B.2.
The first type of arithmetic instructions – the basic ones – are shown in the
first block of Table 3.3. These instructions are: addition, subtraction, multipli-
cation, and division of two corresponding operands. In the second block of
this table, the bitwise instructions are shown. This block of instructions covers
simple operations like bitwise and, or, and xor. In addition also bitwise shift
operations, like right and left shift are supported. In the last block of this table,
all the relational instructions featured in MEMICS are shown. These instructions
cover all kind of lower and greater relations, as well as the equal and not-equal
relation.
48
3.2. The MEMICS Model
Table 3.3. MEMICS Instruction Set: Signed Integer Instructions – Basic Arithmetic, Bitwise
and Relational Operations
Instruction Description
a1 := add(b, c); The result of the addition of registers b and c is stored in
register a.
a1 := sub(b, c); The result of the subtraction of registers b and c is
stored in register a.
a1 := mul(b, c); The result of the multiplication of registers b and c is
stored in register a.
a1 := div(b, c); The result of the division of register b by c is stored in
register a.
a1 := and(b, c); The result of the bitwise “and” of registers b and c is
stored in register a.
a1 := or(b, c); The result of the bitwise “or” of registers b and c is
stored in register a.
a1 := xor(b, c); The result of the bitwise “xor” of registers b and c is
stored in register a.
a1 := sl(b, c); The value from register b is shifted to the left by the
amount located in the register c and the result is stored
in register a.
a1 := sr(b, c); The value from register b is shifted to the right by the
amount located in the register c and the result is stored
in register a.
a1 := sge(b, c); The result of the greater-equal relation between the
registers b and c is stored in register a.
a1 := sgt(b, c); The result of the greater-than relation between the
registers b and c is stored in register a.
a1 := sle(b, c); The result of the smaller-equal relation between the
registers b and c is stored in register a.
a1 := slt(b, c); The result of the smaller-than relation between the
registers b and c is stored in register a.
a1 := seq(b, c); The result of the equal relation between the registers b
and c is stored in register a.
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a1 := sneq(b, c); The result of the not-equal relation between the
registers b and c is stored in register a.
All instructions introduced so far are covered in the MIPS assembly language.
Since the Solver in MEMICS is more advanced than a simple assembly machine,
the instruction set of MEMICS covers far more arithmetic instructions, which
are introduced in the following.
Table 3.4 shows the advanced arithmetic instructions as well as the gradient,
sign and relational specific instructions of MEMICS. The first block covers the
exponential function, power function, logarithm, square-root and the n-th root.
Since none of these functions is directly supported by the MIPS assembly lan-
guage, either at least a common math header or an additional MEMICS header
has to be included. The gradient block features the basic cosine, tangent and
sine instructions, as well as their arc version. The sign instruction is covering the
absolute value. Whereas the relational instructions feature the minimum as well
as the maximum arithmetic for two operands.
Table 3.4. MEMICS Instruction Set: Signed Integer Instructions – Advanced Arithmetic
Instruction Description
a1 := exp(b); The result of the exponential function applied to
register b is stored in register a.
a1 := pow(b, c); The power function of the value from register b to the
basis of the value in register c is computed and stored
in the register a.
a1 := log(b); The logarithm of the value from register b is computed
and stored in register a.
a1 := sqrt(b); The square-root of the value from register b is
computed and stored in register a.
a1 := nroot(b, c); The nth-root of the value from register b, where n is
defined by register c, is assigned to register a.
a1 := cos(b); The cosine value of the value from register b is stored
in register a.
a1 := tan(b); The sine value of the value from register b is stored in
register a.
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a1 := sin(b); The tangent value of the value from register b is stored
in register a.
a1 := arccos(b); The arc cosine value of the value from register b is
stored in register a.
a1 := arctan(b); The arc sine value of the value from register b is stored
in register a.
a1 := arcsin(b); The arc tangent value of the value from register b is
stored in register a.
a1 := abs(b); The absolute value of register b is stored in register a.
a1 := min(b, c); The minimum of the registers b and c is stored in
register a.
a1 := max(b, c); The maximum of the registers b and c is stored in
register a.
3.2.3.2 Memory Instructions
MEMICS is the first ICS with an embedded memory model. Therefore, the in-
struction set features several memory related instructions. In Table 3.5 the in-
structions for memory allocation and freeing are shown. These allocation and
freeing operations access the virtual memory introduced in Section 3.2.1. In
case of arrays and structures MEMICS allocates memory regions according to
the currently configured alignment. This can vary for different machine types.
Therefore, one has to be careful, with direct accesses to such regions, where the
access is directly encoded into the operation.
Table 3.5. MEMICS Instruction Set: Memory Management Instructions – Allocation and
Freeing
Instruction Description
a1 := calloc(b, c); Allocate a number of memory blocks, where the
number is defined by the value in register b and the
size of each block in register c. The base-address of the
entire block is stored in register a.
a1 := malloc(b); Allocate an amount of bytes defined by the value of the
register b and the resulting base-address is stored in
register a.
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free(a); Free the memory region starting from the base-address
defined by register a. The amount of bytes to free is
retrieved via the malloc table.
Table 3.6 shows the MEMICS instructions for copying and setting memory
regions. These representatives of the memcpy and memset functions are very
useful in order to reduce the complexity of the sources to analyze. Their usage
however, can be responsible for the non-detection of race conditions in a concur-
rent “execution” of e. g., a memcpy operation and a memset operation. Therefore,
the user can configure whether he or she wants to use the built-in versions, or
not. In case not, he or she also has to provide the sources for these operations,
since there exist several different implementations of these operations.
Table 3.6. MEMICS Instruction Set: Memory Management Instructions – Memory Copy,
Set and Miscellaneous
Instruction Description
memcpy(a, b, c); Copy n bytes from the base-address
defined in register b, where n is defined in
register c, to the memory region starting at
the base-address defined in register a.
memset(a, b, c); Store b into n bytes – n is defined in
register c – from the base-address defined
in register a.
a1 := memAdr(b, c); Compute the memory address starting at
register b with an offset defined in register
c and store it in register a.
memRst(b, c); Reset the memory region from the address
defined in register b for n bytes, defined in
register c.
a1 := getGlobalIndex(<b>); Retrieve the base-address of the global
variable defined by the identifier <b> and
store it in register a.
a1 := getJumpIndex(<b>); Get the program counter index of a
function or basic block defined by the
identifier <b> and store it in register a.
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The memAdr instruction is required by the load- and store-instructions, which
are introduced in Table 3.7. This instruction computes a memory address based
on a base-address and a corresponding offset. The last instruction in this block
is the memRst instruction, which is used for local stack memory management.
With this function such local stack regions can be entirely reset and assigned to
undefined values.
In Table 3.7 all load and store instructions featured in MEMICS are shown.
Table 3.7. MEMICS Instruction Set: Load and Store Instructions
Instruction Description
lb(a1, memAdr(b, c), clk ); Read one byte from the memory address
computed by memAdr and store it in
register a. clk is required for analysis of
concurrent errors.
lbu(a1, memAdr(b, c), clk ); Read one byte from the memory address
computed by memAdr, interpreted as an
unsigned value and store it in register a.
clk is required for analysis of concurrent
errors.
lh(a1, memAdr(b, c), clk ); Read two bytes from the memory address
computed by memAdr and store the result
in register a. clk is required for analysis
of concurrent errors.
lhu(a1, memAdr(b, c), clk ); Read two bytes from the memory address
computed by memAdr, interpreted as
unsigned values and store the result in
register a. clk is required for analysis of
concurrent errors.
lw(a1, memAdr(b, c), clk ); Four bytes from the memory address com-
puted by memAdr and store the result in
register a. clk is required for analysis of
concurrent errors.
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ld(a1, memAdr(b, c), clk ); Read eight bytes from the memory address
computed by memAdr and store the result
in register a. clk is required for analysis
of concurrent errors.
sb(a, memAdr(b, c), clk ); Store the value of register a into one byte
at the memory address computed by
memAdr. clk is required for analysis of
concurrent errors.
sh(a, memAdr(b, c), clk ); Store the value of register a into two bytes
starting at the base-address computed by
memAdr. clk is required for analysis of
concurrent errors.
sw(a, memAdr(b, c), clk ); Store the value of register a into four bytes
starting at the base-address computed by
memAdr. clk is required for analysis of
concurrent errors.
sd(a, memAdr(b, c), clk ); Store the value of register a into eight
bytes starting at the base-address com-
puted by memAdr. clk is required for
analysis of concurrent errors.
Each of these instructions first computes the base address required for the
operation. In the next step of a load instruction, the corresponding amount of
bytes is read from the memory and finally assembled together. The amount
of bytes is directly encoded in the instruction name, from one byte towards
eight bytes. The _clk_ is required for the detection of race conditions, which is
explained in detail in Section 3.4.6. The store instructions operate analogously
to the load instructions, but instead of reading from the memory they store an
amount of bytes into a memory region.
3.2.3.3 Cast and Conversion Instructions
Since MEMICS currently works like a MIPS machine regarding floating point
instructions, the co-processor directives have to be met. Therefore, MEMICS also
features the two move commands, which copy the bit-representation of an inte-
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ger register into a floating point register and vice versa. These two instructions
are shown in Table 3.8. Since the current implementation only features 32-bit
long words, these move instructions can copy the bit-vector of one register into
the other, immediately.
Table 3.8. MEMICS Instruction Set: Communication between Floating Point and Integer
Registers
Instruction Description
mov_w_f(a, bfp); Copy each bit from register a into the floating point
register bfp.
mov_f_w(afp, b); Copy each bit from the floating point register afp into
register b.
The actual conversion between an integer bit-vector into its correspond-
ing floating point bit-vector, among floating point bit-vectors and vice versa is
handled by a separate set of instructions. These instructions are introduced in
Table 3.9. Please note that none of the original assembly instructions feature sev-
eral rounding modes, whereas MEMICS currently only supports “round to near-
est” (RN). In the first block all the instructions converting into double-precision
floating point are shown. The source can either be a long-word, single-precision
float or a word. The second block features those instructions casting towards a
single-precision float, where the sources are the same as for the previous block.
In the last block all the instructions covering casts from floating point into either
a long-word or word integer representation are shown. The source can either be
a single- or double-precision float for both cases.
Table 3.9. MEMICS Instruction Set: Cast Instructions
Instruction Description
a1 := cvt_d_l(b); Convert the long word from register b into a double
precision float and store it in register a.
a1 := cvt_d_s(b); Convert the single precision float from register b into
a double precision float and store it in register a.
55
3. The MEMICS Software Verification Approach
a1 := cvt_d_w(b); Convert the word from register b into a double
precision float and store it in register a.
a1 := cvt_s_d(b); Convert the double precision float from register b
into a single precision float and store it in register a.
a1 := cvt_s_l(b); Convert the long word from register b into a single
precision float and store it in register a.
a1 := cvt_s_w(b); Convert the word from register b into a single
precision float and store it in register a.
a1 := cvt_l_d(b); Convert the double precision float from register b
into a long word and store it in register a.
a1 := cvt_l_s(b); Convert the single precision float from register b into
a long word and store it in register a.
a1 := cvt_w_d(b); Convert the double precision float from register b
into a word and store it in register a.
a1 := cvt_w_s(b); Convert the single precision float from register b into
a word and store it in register a.
In Table 3.10 all the round instructions featured in MEMICS are shown.
These instructions cover the basic round, truncate, ceil, and floor operations.
The rounding criterion for the round instruction is “round to the nearest”. The
source of the instruction is either a single- or double-precision float and the
corresponding destination either a long-word or word integer. The rounding
criterion for the truncate instruction is: “round towards zero”. For the ceil in-
struction the criterion is: “round up” and the criterion for the floor instruction
is: “round down”.
Table 3.10. MEMICS Instruction Set: Round Instructions – Round, Truncate, Ceil and
Floor
Instruction Description
a1 := round_l_d(b); The round value of the double precision floating
point value from register b is stored as a long word
in register a.
a1 := round_l_s(b); The round value of the single precision floating
point value from register b is stored as a long word
in register a.
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a1 := round_w_d(b); The round value of the double precision floating
point value from register b is stored as a word in
register a.
a1 := round_w_s(b); The round value of the single precision floating
point value from register b is stored as a word in
register a.
a1 := trunc_l_d(b); The truncated value of the double precision
floating point value from register b is stored as a
long word in register a.
a1 := trunc_l_s(b); The truncated value of the single precision floating
point value from register b is stored as a long word
in register a.
a1 := trunc_w_d(b); The truncated value of the double precision
floating point value from register b is stored as a
word in register a.
a1 := trunc_w_s(b); The truncated value of the single precision floating
point value from register b is stored as a word in
register a.
a1 := ceil_l_d(b); The ceiled value of the double precision floating
point value from register b is stored as a long word
in register a.
a1 := ceil_l_s(b); The ceiled value of the single precision floating
point value from register b is stored as a long word
in register a.
a1 := ceil_w_d(b); The ceiled value of the double precision floating
point value from register b is stored as a word in
register a.
a1 := ceil_w_s(b); The ceiled value of the single precision floating
point value from register b is stored as a word in
register a.
a1 := floor_l_d(b); The floor value of the double precision floating
point value from register b is stored as a long word
in register a.
a1 := floor_l_s(b); The floor value of the single precision floating
point value from register b is stored as a long word
in register a.
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a1 := floor_w_d(b); The floor value of the double precision floating
point value from register b is stored as a word in
register a.
a1 := floor_w_s(b); The floor value of the single precision floating
point value from register b is stored as a word in
register a.
3.2.3.4 Synchronization Instructions
In order to provide a synchronization mechanism, MEMICS features the waitOn-
Event instruction, which is introduced in Table 3.11. In the current implementa-
tion of MEMICS this mechanism works according to the WaitEvent definition in
the OSEK OS specification [6].
Table 3.11. MEMICS Instruction Set: Synchronization Instructions
Instruction Description
waitOnEvent(a); This functions checks whether the value of an
event, stored in register a, is true or not.
3.2.4 Mapping of C/C++ Source Code
In order to locate errors later on directly in the source code, a mapping be-
tween the input code and an instruction inside the model must be achieved.
For this purpose the MEMICS assembly backend uses the DWARF [87, 88] de-
bug information, which is already available in LLVM. At each lowering of an
assembly instruction to a MEMICS instruction, the backend equips the new
instruction with the information on the file name, the location inside the file
and the according label, representing the actual C variable behind the location.
3.2.1 Example (The MEMICS Model of the Automotive Race Condition Exam-
ple 2.3.1).
In Listing 3.1 the MEMICS Model for the function worker1 of the automotive
example is shown. The entire model can be found in Appendix A. The structure
of the basic blocks is equivalent to those from Listing 2.4, although they are
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actually not used in MEMICS. Instead, the program counter (PC) is hard-coded
into the model. Since MEMICS is built based directly on the MIPS assembly
language, the access to a global variable is equivalent to Example 2.6.2, like e. g.,
the first access of data1Ready at PC 179.
Listing 3.1. The MEMICS Model of the Function worker1 of the Automotive Race Condi-
tion Example 
1 PC = 174 -> PC’ = 175;
2 PC = 175 -> PC’ = 176;
3 PC = 176 -> sp_reg’ = sp_reg +U 4294967240 AND PC’ = 177;
4 PC = 177 -> sw(ra_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 52), _clk_) AND PC’ = 178;
5 PC = 178 -> 2_reg’ = gp_reg +U getGlobalIndex(worker1Ready) AND
6 PC’ = 179;
7 PC = 179 -> 3_reg’ = gp_reg +U getGlobalIndex(data1Ready) AND
8 PC’ = 180;
9 PC = 180 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(2_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 181;
10 PC = 181 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(3_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 182;
11 PC = 182 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 40), _clk_) AND PC’ = 183;
12 PC = 183 -> ra_reg’ = 185 AND PC’ = 1;
13 PC = 184 -> PC’ = 185;
14 PC = 185 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 40), _clk_) AND PC’ = 186;
15 PC = 186 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(2_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 187;
16 PC = 187 AND waitOnEvent(data1Ready)-> PC’ = 188;
17 PC = 188 -> PC’ = 189;
18 PC = 189 -> 3_reg’ = 0 +U 2 AND PC’ = 190;
19 PC = 190 -> sw(0, memAdr(sp_reg, 48), _clk_) AND PC’ = 191;
20 PC = 191 -> sw(3_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 44), _clk_) AND PC’ = 192;
21 PC = 192 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 36), _clk_) AND PC’ = 193;
22 PC = 193 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 48), _clk_) AND PC’ = 194;
23 PC = 194 -> lw(3_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 44), _clk_) AND PC’ = 195;
24 PC = 195 -> 2_reg’ = 2_reg < 3_reg AND PC’ = 196;
25 PC = 196 AND 2_reg == 0 -> PC’ = 242;
26 PC = 197 -> PC’ = 198;
27 PC = 198 -> PC’ = 200;
28 PC = 199 -> PC’ = 200;
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29 PC = 200 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 48), _clk_) AND PC’ = 201;
30 PC = 201 -> 2_reg’ = 0 +U 4 AND PC’ = 202;
31 PC = 202 -> 5_reg’ = 0 +U 2_reg AND PC’ = 203;
32 PC = 203 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 32), _clk_) AND PC’ = 204;
33 PC = 204 -> ra_reg’ = 206 AND PC’ = 31;
34 PC = 205 -> PC’ = 206;
35 PC = 206 -> 4_reg’ = gp_reg +U getGlobalIndex(sensors) AND
36 PC’ = 207;
37 PC = 207 -> lw(5_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 48), _clk_) AND PC’ = 208;
38 PC = 208 -> 2_reg’ = 2_reg << 2 AND PC’ = 209;
39 PC = 209 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(4_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 210;
40 PC = 210 -> 3_reg’ = 5_reg << 2 AND PC’ = 211;
41 PC = 211 -> 2_reg’ = 4_reg +U 2_reg AND PC’ = 212;
42 PC = 212 -> 3_reg’ = 4_reg +U 3_reg AND PC’ = 213;
43 PC = 213 -> lw(3_reg’, memAdr(3_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 214;
44 PC = 214 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(2_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 215;
45 PC = 215 -> sw(4_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 28), _clk_) AND PC’ = 216;
46 PC = 216 -> 4_reg’ = 0 +U 5_reg AND PC’ = 217;
47 PC = 217 -> lw(5_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 32), _clk_) AND PC’ = 218;
48 PC = 218 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 24), _clk_) AND PC’ = 219;
49 PC = 219 -> sw(3_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 20), _clk_) AND PC’ = 220;
50 PC = 220 -> ra_reg’ = 222 AND PC’ = 47;
51 PC = 221 -> PC’ = 222;
52 PC = 222 -> 2_reg’ = 2_reg << 2 AND PC’ = 223;
53 PC = 223 -> lw(3_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 20), _clk_) AND PC’ = 224;
54 PC = 224 -> 3_reg’ = 3_reg << 1 AND PC’ = 225;
55 PC = 225 -> 4_reg’ = gp_reg +U getGlobalIndex(tmp) AND
56 PC’ = 226;
57 PC = 226 -> lw(5_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 28), _clk_) AND PC’ = 227;
58 PC = 227 -> 2_reg’ = 5_reg +U 2_reg AND PC’ = 228;
59 PC = 228 -> lw(6_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 48), _clk_) AND PC’ = 229;
60 PC = 229 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(2_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 230;
61 PC = 230 -> lw(7_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 24), _clk_) AND PC’ = 231;
62 PC = 231 -> 3_reg’ = 7_reg -U 3_reg AND PC’ = 232;
63 PC = 232 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(4_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 233;
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64 PC = 233 -> 6_reg’ = 6_reg << 2 AND PC’ = 234;
65 PC = 234 -> 2_reg’ = 3_reg +U 2_reg AND PC’ = 235;
66 PC = 235 -> 3_reg’ = 4_reg +U 6_reg AND PC’ = 236;
67 PC = 236 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(3_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 237;
68 PC = 237 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 48), _clk_) AND PC’ = 238;
69 PC = 238 -> 2_reg’ = 2_reg +U 1 AND PC’ = 239;
70 PC = 239 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 48), _clk_) AND PC’ = 240;
71 PC = 240 -> PC’ = 193;
72 PC = 241 -> PC’ = 242;
73 PC = 242 -> 2_reg’ = gp_reg +U getGlobalIndex(worker1Ready) AND
74 PC’ = 243;
75 PC = 243 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(2_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 244;
76 PC = 244 -> ra_reg’ = 246 AND PC’ = 11;
77 PC = 245 -> PC’ = 246;
78 PC = 246 -> lw(ra_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 52), _clk_) AND
79 PC’ = 247;
80 PC = 247 -> sp_reg’ = sp_reg +U 56 AND resetMem(sp_reg, 56) AND
81 PC’ = 248;
82 PC = 248 -> PC’ = ra_reg;
83 PC = 249 -> PC’ = 250; 
3.3 The MEMICS Task Model
For a proper support of task-based systems used in the automotive domain like
AUTOSAR and OSEK the MEMICS Model has been extended. The resulting task
model features a set of tasks R = {r1, . . . ,rp }. Each task r j is defined over the
subset of states S1 = {s j1 , . . . , s jk } and the subset of transitions T 1 = {t j 11 , . . . , t j 1l } of
the original MEMICS Model M . The transition t j 1i
of a task r j is defined as the
4-tuple: < s ji , a,c, s1ji >, like in the original MEMICS Model. In addition a tasks
requires the parameters:
core, prio, preempt, freq, idle, start, run, wait.
The parameter core specifies to which processor core the task is assigned, and
prio defines the priority of the task, which is required for scheduling. The pa-
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rameter freq defines the cycle-time (frequency) of a task in milliseconds, so e. g.,
a 10ms task has the frequency 10. The preempt parameter declares, whether
the task is cooperative or preemptive and can therefore be interrupted during
execution by any task with higher priority. The four remaining parameters idle,
start, run and wait are required to model a proper scheduling among all tasks
of a system modeled in MEMICS. The different scheduling states of one task are
illustrated in Figure 3.4.
startidle
waitrun
1.
2.
3. 4.
5.
6.
8.
7.
9.
Figure 3.4. The Scheduler of a Task inside MEMICS represented by a State Machine
Let’s assume a task is initially in the idle state – whereas at the start of a
verification run, all tasks are either set to run or wait according to their priority.
Depending on the frequency of a task, the system puts the task periodically
and correspondingly into the start state. From here, the scheduler decides –
depending on the priority of the task and on the current state of all other tasks
on the same core –, whether the current task can be executed (run) or has to
wait. Once a task finished its execution, it returns to the idle state. In order
to provide a correct scheduling of all tasks t j on one processor core and the
assumption that the tasks on this core are ordered according to their priority
from highest (1) to lowest (n), the following rules must hold:
Transition 1: idlei^clk%(freqi) 0Ñ idlei
In case task i is currently in state idle and is not triggered according to its
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frequency, it remains in idle.
Transition 2: idlei^clk%(freqi)= 0Ñ starti
The scheduler starts the activation of task i , which is currently in idle, result-
ing in a switch into the start state.
Transition 3:
starti^
i1∧
f=1
startf+ runf+waitf = 0^
n∧
k=i+1
runk+!preemptk¤ 1Ñ runi
If there exists no task t f , which is currently either in state start, run or wait,
with higher priority then ti and in addition there is no task tk , which is
currently running and is cooperative, with a lower priority, the task ti can be
finally activated and is entering the state run.
Transition 4:
starti^
i1∨
f=1
startf+ runf+waitf 0^
n∨
k=i+1
runk+!preemptk = 2Ñwaiti
Otherwise, if there exists one task t f with higher priority, which is currently
in state start, run or wait, or if one task tk with lower priority is running and
cooperative, the task ti must be waiting for at least one more cycle.
Transition 5:
waiti^
i1∨
f=1
startf+ runf+waitf 0_
n∨
k=i+1
runk+!preemptk = 2Ñwaiti
In case task ti is waiting and there exists one task t f , which is currently in
state start, run or wait, or there exists one task tk , which is currently running
and can not be interrupted, the task ti must remain in the wait state.
Transition 6:
waiti^
i1∨
f=1
startf+ runf+waitf = 0^
n∧
k=i+1
runk+!preemptk¤ 1Ñ runi
If the task ti is waiting and no task t f is in state start, run or wait and no
task tk is running and can not be preempted, ti is activated and switches to
state run.
Transition 7: runi^!preempti_
i1∨
f=1
startf+waitf = 0Ñ runi
Task ti , which is currently running, remains in the run state, if it is either
cooperative or no other task t f with higher priority exists, which is currently
in state start or wait.
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Transition 8: runi^preempti^
i1∨
f=1
startf+waitf 0Ñwaiti
In case the preemptive task ti is running and there exists one other task t f ,
which is currently in state start or wait, the task ti must switch to wait.
Transition 9: runi^currentInsti = terminatorInstÑ idlei
Once the last instruction of the running task ti is passed, ti switches to the
idle state and waits for its next activation.
General Rule:
n∑
j=1
runj¤ 1
This rule ensures that only one task t j is actually running at one time, since
only one atomic operation can be processed by one core.
In order to operate with respect to the synchronization instruction waitOnEvent,
MEMICS reschedules the system during the period a task is waiting for an event.
Under consideration of these rules, MEMICS is able to model an entire task
based system like AUTOSAR or OSEK, although those systems provide common
interrupt service routines (ISR), which can possibly interfere with any task at
any time. In order to be safe from possible runtime errors, MEMICS constrains
the author of sources to be analyzed with MEMICS, to secure all critical sections
– e. g., access to global memory – by at least disabling all ISRs. On the other hand
this ensures more safety of the source code and in addition reduces the search
space of MEMICS considerably.
3.3.1 MEMICS Virtual System Configuration
This section shows the configuration of the virtual system modeling the ECU in
MEMICS. This includes the hardware with the CPU and memory, as well as the
operating system, including tasks, interrupt service routines, synchronization
and so on. The format of the configuration has been derived from the general
OIL standard. For details refer to Section 2.1.1. The configuration is divided
into the different sections: the basis system, tasks, Interrupt Service Routines
(ISRs), and alarms, counters and events.
Listing 3.2 shows the configuration for the system, an ISR and a task. The
system configures the CPU with a number of cores and the frequency in MHz
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with which it is running. In addition the available amount of system RAM has to
be defined in MB. Although the type of memory alignment is configurable, the
alignment is specified per default to 4 byte.
Listing 3.2. MEMICS System Configuration: The System, ISR and Task 
1 SYSTEM { | MAXCYCLE = <int>;
2 NUMOFCORES = <int>; | };
3 FREQUENCY = <int> MHz; |
4 MEMSIZE = <int> MB; | TASK {
5 ---------------------------- | NAME = <string>;
6 MEMALIGN = <int> bytes; | FREQUENCY = <int> ms;
7 }; | PRIORITY = <int>;
8 | CORE = <int>;
9 ISR { | PREEMPTIVE = <bool>;
10 NAME = <string>; | --------------------------
11 CATEGORY = <bool>; | STACKSIZE = <int>;
12 ---------------------------- | EVENT = <string>;
13 RESOURCE = <string>; | RESOURCE = <string>;
14 MINCYCLE = <int>; | }; 
A task is defined by a unique id, its name, which in MEMICS has to be
exactly the name of the entry function of the task. In addition its frequency
in ms, the priority – required by the scheduler – and the core it is assigned to,
have to be specified. The configuration also includes a flag, whether the task is
preemptive or not. The stacksize is an obligatory configuration item, its default
value set to 1024 byte. In case a task requires synchronization via an event,
the corresponding event(s) has(have) to be specified here. Also the resource
is an obligatory configuration item. In terms of OSEK a resource describes a
behavior like e. g., a mutex or a semaphore. The name of an ISR is again its
unique identifier and in addition the corresponding function entry point. The
Boolean category flag determines, if the interrupt is hardware- or software-
based. The definition of the resource is similar to the one for a task. The two
configuration items MINCYCLE and MAXCYCLE can be used to help MEMICS reduce
the search space with respect to the ISR, by defining the observed time intervals
in which an ISR must occur once.
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Listing 3.3 presents the configuration for alarms, counters and events. A
counter is defined by a unique name and has a fixed number of enumerations
defined as NUMCYCLES. An event is simply defined by a unique identifier name.
Unlike in OSEK, where the specification of an event has to be unique corre-
sponding to a waiting task, is the relation between tasks and events surjective in
MEMICS. This is required, in order to activate more than one task on different
cores simultaneously. An event is triggered by the SETEVENT routine, shown in
the configuration of ALARM1. An alarm is defined by its name as a unique identi-
fier and must in addition have a counter object. The second alarm (ALARM2) is
used to directly activate tasks.
Listing 3.3. MEMICS System Configuration: Alarm, Counter and Event 
1 COUNTER { | EVENT {
2 NAME = <string>; | NAME = <string>;
3 NUMCYCLES = <int>; | };
4 }; |
5 |
6 ALARM1 { | ALARM2 {
7 NAME = <string>; | NAME = <string>;
8 COUNTER = <string>; | COUNTER = <string>;
9 ACTION = SETEVENT { | ACTION = ACTIVATETASK {
10 EVENT = <string>; | TASK = <string>;
11 }; | };
12 }; | }; 
3.3.1 Example (The MEMICS Model Configuration for the Automotive Race Con-
dition Example).
The system configuration for the running Example 2.3.1 is shown in Listing 3.4.
The hardware of this system consists of a CPU with three cores, running at
50MHz, and features 256MB of RAM, which is 4-byte aligned. The corresponding
software contains the two 10ms tasks readInputs and writeOutputs, which are
both running on the first core and are in cooperative mode – non-preemptive.
The two tasks computing the Laplace operator worker1 and worker2 are also
scheduled in the 10ms slot and are both also non-preemptive. But worker1 is
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assigned to the second core and worker2 to the third. In addition the config-
uration contains the four events data1Ready, data2Ready, worker1Ready, and
worker2Ready, which are required for communication among the tasks.
Listing 3.4. MEMICS Virtual System Configuration for the Automotive Race Condition
Example 
1 SYSTEM { | TASK {
2 NUMOFCORES = 3; | NAME = worker1;
3 FREQUENCY = 50; | FREQUENCY = 10;
4 MEMSIZE = 256; | PRIORITY = 1;
5 MEMALIGN = 4; | CORE = 1;
6 }; | PREEMPTIVE = 0;
7 | EVENT = data1Ready;
8 TASK { | };
9 NAME = readInputs; |
10 FREQUENCY = 10; | TASK {
11 PRIORITY = 1; | NAME = worker2;
12 CORE = 0; | FREQUENCY = 10;
13 PREEMPTIVE = 0; | PRIORITY = 1;
14 }; | CORE = 2;
15 | PREEMPTIVE = 0;
16 TASK { | EVENT = data2Ready;
17 NAME = writeOutputs; | };
18 FREQUENCY = 10; |
19 PRIORITY = 2; | EVENT {
20 CORE = 0; | NAME = data1Ready;
21 PREEMPTIVE = 0; | };
22 EVENT = worker1Ready; | EVENT {
23 EVENT = worker2Ready; | NAME = data2Ready;
24 }; | };
25 |
26 EVENT { | EVENT {
27 NAME = worker1Ready; | NAME = worker2Ready;
28 }; | }; 
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3.4 The MEMICS Core
In the MEMICS Core the actual verification is performed by a Bounded Model
Checking (BMC) approach of the MEMICS Model. Note that, compared to com-
mon BMC, the property to check is in most of the cases not encoded into the
formula, but encoded into the proof engine. However, it is still possible to pass a
property to MEMICS as input, like e. g., a label in the source code to be reached.
An overview of this process is shown in Figure 3.5.
MEMICS CORE
MEMICS
Model
Counter
Example
Model
is Save
MEMICS
Proof Engine
Next
Iteration
Unrolling/
Logic
Encoding
Figure 3.5. Overview of the Core of the MEMICS Software Verification Approach
The MEMICS Model is unwound step by step into a logic formula, which
is passed to the internal proof engine. This proof engine checks, if the current
formula contains any kind of runtime error or not. If an error is found the
engine can return the specific trace leading to it. In the other case, the process
continues with a new unrolling step. The process is running until a runtime
error is identified, the source code is proven to be safe – in respect to the errors
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MEMICS is able to detect –, or a timeout occurred.
3.4.1 Unrolling of the MEMICS Model
The efficiency of model unrolling has a large impact on the runtime complexity
in BMC. Most common tools provide a simple unrolling mechanism, which
unrolls the entire model at each iteration and encodes it in SSA form. The
resulting formula of such an unrolling is of size O(nk), with the assumption that
the model consists of n possible transitions among the states and the current
iteration is k. MEMICS unrolls only the current set of relevant instructions,
which results in a fewer number of clauses. This unrolling process is illustrated
in Example 3.4.1.
3.4.1 Example (Model Unrolling).
Assume the relevant program control flow is the one shown in Figure 3.6. The
transition from state s1 to s2 is unrolled straight forward. The state s2 represents
a basic C if-statement, which branches depending on the truth value of the
condition c1. In case this truth value is unique, MEMICS strictly unrolls either
the true branch towards the state s3 or the false branch s4, only. Otherwise both
transitions have to be unrolled, which results in a set of two successor states s3
and s4. Respectively to the set of successor states, the unrolling continues until
the join state si1 has been reached, regardless of whether the if-branch, the
else-branch or both branches have been unwound. The transition to state si is
again straight forward. The construct around the state si is a simple loop, which
runs depending on the truth value of the condition c2, defined by the sequence
(si Ñ si+1Ñ . . .Ñ sm1Ñ si1). In case the loop condition is true the sequence
is unrolled or if it is false the transition towards state sm is unrolled, only. If the
condition results in an unknown truth value, both cases have to be unrolled. The
unrolling process is finished, if the only remaining state in the set to unroll is
send .
The current implementation of MEMICS features three different modes of
model unrolling: basic, task-based and path-based.
basic: The basic unrolling mode is defined for common C/C++ programs. In
this case the model is unwound exactly as described in Example 3.4.1.
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si−1
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Figure 3.6. Example Control Flow of a Program defined by the MEMICS Model
task-based: The task-based unrolling mode, is an extended basic unrolling,
which includes all the relevant scheduling rules for all tasks – as defined
in Section 3.3. In addition, if the unrolling process is able to decide if one
task is not active at all, the according task is not unrolled until it becomes
active, again.
path-based: In path-based unrolling mode MEMICS creates entire paths lead-
ing to a specific target, only. The search for such a target is currently imple-
mented breadth first in MEMICS.
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3.4.2 The MEMICS Interval Constraint Solver
The backend of MEMICS is an Interval Constraint Solver (ICS), which is special-
ized with respect to program analysis, where the focus on the MIPS assembly
language including its memory operations. The ICS in general is based on the
ideas from HySAT and its successor iSAT. The main solve routine of MEMICS,
which is illustrated in pseudo-code in Listing 3.5, is an implementation of the
BMC approach.
Listing 3.5. The MEMICS Overall BMC Algorithm 
1 bool solve() {
2 result = false;
3 while (!foundRuntimeError && !EOF) {
4 // unroll the next set of instructions
5 if (update())
6 // start the actual search
7 result = search();
8 }
9 return result;
10 } 
The process is running as long as no runtime error can be found or if other-
wise it has traversed the entire sources (EOF). In the first step, the solver updates
its clause database by calling the unroll-routine of the underlying model. In case
the unrolling of the current iteration raises a trivial conflict, the solver straight
drops towards the next iteration. In order to check for such a trivial conflict, the
update-routine contains a preprocessing unit. This preprocessing unit fires the
first initial unit propagation steps on the current clause database. If there exists
any clause, which is in conflict with the current variable assignments, the entire
formula cannot be fulfilled – at least in this iteration. In case the update process
succeeded, the solver starts the actual search process, which is the core routine
of any SAT-/SMT-Solver.
The main search procedure of MEMICS is based on the Davis Putnam Love-
land Logemann (DPLL) algorithm, like HySAT and iSAT. In Listing 3.6 a pseudo-
code like implementation of the search algorithm is shown.
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Listing 3.6. The MEMICS Search Algorithm based on DPLL 
1 bool search() {
2 // run until a runtime error is found
3 while (!foundRuntimeError) {
4 // propagate all current decisions,
5 // and check for any conflict
6 conflict = icp();
7 // in case a conflict is raised, check if its
8 // reasonable and try to remove it from the tree
9 if (conflict) {
10 // conflicts on decision level 0 are invalid
11 if (DL == 0) return false;
12 newDL = analyze(conflict, &learnt);
13 backtrackAndAddClause(newDL, learnt);
14 }
15 // otherwise a new variable decision takes place
16 else {
17 // no more variables available
18 if (varQueue.empty()) {
19 // target mode -> error location reached
20 if (searchForTarget) return true;
21 // check for alternate paths
22 if (!checkForPaths(&other, &newDL)
23 return false;
24 else
25 backtrackAndAddClause(newDL, other);
26 }
27 // decide the next variable
28 else
29 decide();
30 }
31 }
32 } 
The search algorithm runs until either: a runtime error has been found (line:
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3), a unresolvable conflict occurs (line: 11), a specific target has been reached
(line: 20), or all possible program paths have been traversed (line: 23). In the first
step the algorithm runs the Interval Constraint Propagation (ICP), which, in case
there exists a conflict according to the current assignment, returns the conflicting
clause. If a conflict occurred during ICP, the solver analyzes the current trail and
computes the cause of the conflict. In case such a cause is identifiable, a learnt
clause is generated, which eliminates the exact trail from all succeeding runs.
Therefore, the solver backtracks the trail towards to corresponding backtrack
level and adds the learnt clause to its clause database. If on the other hand
ICP did not raise any conflict, the solver switches into the decision state. In the
decision state, the solver checks whether the variable queue is empty or not. If
the queue is empty, all currently available variables have a pending assignment
and the solver either returns – in case a specific target has been defined – or
checks for other paths, which either results in backtracking towards that new
path and the search continues or the search terminates – indicating that the
current iteration is free of any runtime error.
In the following several subroutines of the search process are introduced in
detail: icp in Subsection 3.4.2.1, analyze in Subsection 3.4.2.2 and decide in
Subsection 3.4.2.4.
3.4.2.1 Interval Constraint Propagation (ICP)
The propagation step – in case of MEMICS: Interval Constraint Propagation –
is the heart of all state of the art solvers based on the DPLL algorithm. In the
propagation step the solver tries to fulfill a literal of a clause, which is unit un-
der the current assignment and therefore must be true in order to fulfill the
entire clause. If the procedure is not able to fulfill the current literal, the clause
it belongs to is in conflict with the current assignment and is therefore returned
as conflict clause. In [42] HySAT/iSAT was used as a backend-end solver, but
once the source files to analyze outreached a few hundred lines of code, the
approach did not scale any more. As aforementioned, the main reasons there-
fore are located in the unrolling procedure, and the lack of assembly language
specific theories in the solver, which require a lot of additional definitions in the
logic formula. In order to properly verify software and overcome the observed
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problems, the ICP procedure of MEMICS has been equipped with a lot of new
features. Therefore the main ICP routine has been split up into several parts, like
the basic arithmetic, memory access routines and type specific routines. Each of
these icp routines is introduced in detail in the following.
icpArithmetic
The icpArithmetic routine covers all kind of arithmetic interval propagations.
During this deduction process, each operation is checked for any kind of runtime
error like e. g., an arithmetic over-/underflow or a division by zero. In addition,
MEMICS features, compared to iSAT, also bitwise operations on integer values,
like e. g., arithmetic and, or and shift operations. All these operations are also
handled in the icpArithmetic routine.
icpFree
In the icpFree operation a common free or delete instruction is propagated. The
operation checks if the address to be freed itself is valid, including the amount of
bytes to be freed. Two cases have to be distinguished: a propagation at decision
level (DL) zero or any other DL. On DL zero the memory is just freed. Otherwise
the free operation has to be tracked in the free table and in addition the current
memory entries have to be backed up on top because the operation can possibly
get reverted during the search process, when the solver triggers the backtracking
mechanism.
icpLoad
icpLoad represents the load operation of MEMICS. It can load a byte, a half-
word, a word and a long-word from the internal memory. The solver checks,
if the underlying memory area is allocated and throws a null dereference, if
not. In addition it checks for uninitialized memory and warns the user, if one is
found. All the load operations are tracked, together with the store operations,
in a memory access table in order to identify race conditions with MEMICS. In
Section 3.4.6 these race checks are described in detail.
icpMalloc
icpMalloc is used to allocate memory. Therefore, an allocation table tracks all
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allocations and is used to determine the next free memory address for a malloc
request. In case the virtual MEMICS Model runs out of memory an exception is
thrown.
icpMemcpy/icpMemset
icpMemcpy and icpMemset are used to handle memcpy- and memset-like oper-
ations internally. The memcpy operation requires the destination address, the
source address and the amount of bytes to be copied. The memset operation re-
quires the destination address, the value and the amount of bytes to be set. The
solver checks on both operations if the memory behind the address is allocated
and respectively throws a null dereference. Additionally it checks the memcpy
operation for uninitialized memory at the source memory and warns the user.
icpStore
icpStore represents the store operation. Like the load operation it supports byte-,
half-word-, word- and long-word-wise access to the memory. The operation
is also checked for null dereferences. Additionally also each store operation is
tracked in a memory access table, in order to identify race conditions, which is
described in Section 3.4.6.
3.4.2.2 Conflict Analysis and Backtracking
The conflict analysis in MEMICS works in general like any common state of the
art SAT conflict analysis. The analysis algorithm in short is shown in Listing 3.7.
Generally the algorithm searches for all pending decisions towards the actual
conflict, until the first unit implication points (UIP). If no such a first UIP is
found the algorithm creates a new literal consisting out of the negated bound
of the current pending decision and adds it to the learnt clause. Otherwise the
algorithm gathers all decisions on the current path until all first UIPs are iden-
tified and the entire learnt clause is generated. This learnt clause ensures that
the exact conflict can not occur any more in all succeeding runs of the search
process. At the end of the algorithm the learnt clause is checked for possible
duplicate literals, which are then erased from it. And finally the backtrack level
for the current learnt clause is computed and returned.
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Listing 3.7. The Analyze Algorithm to Calculate the Reasons for a Conflict 
1 int analyze(clause* conflict, clause* learnt) {
2 int backtrackDL = -1;
3 decisionVec decs = conflict->getReasons();
4
5 while (!decs.empty()) {
6 decisionVec newDecs;
7 for (iterator d in decs) {
8 // In case decision d has reasons, add them to
9 // the queue
10 if (!d.getReasons().empty())
11 newDecs.insert(d.getReasons());
12 // if the decision is just based on a variable
13 // decision, add the negated relation to learnt
14 // clause
15 else if (d.getData() == NULL) {
16 Lit l(d.getVar(), not(d.getRel()), d.getOp());
17 learnt.addLit(l);
18 }
19 }
20 decs.clear();
21 decs.insert(newDecs);
22 }
23
24 learnt = eraseDuplicates(learnt);
25 backtrackDL = findBacktrackDL(learnt);
26
27 return backtrackDL;
28 } 
3.4.2.3 Variable Queue
The variable queue is one of the heart pieces in a state of the art SAT-/SMT-Solver.
Usually this queue contains all those variables, which are not initially assigned
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with a fix point value via unit propagation. Since the focus of MEMICS is program
analysis, where the program defines a specific control flow, the variable queue
is sorted corresponding to this control flow. Otherwise the solver might be able
to find a satisfying assignment according to common SAT-/SMT-Rules, but this
assignment would be a false positive with respect to the program. Therefore,
the variables in the queue are ordered based on their “temporal” occurrence in
the control flow. And, in addition, the queue only contains the registers of all
instructions, and no state flow information like program counter variables. The
reason therefore resides in the fact that with the decision of the next variable
from the queue, one of the occurrences of the corresponding program counter
variable becomes unit.
3.4.2.4 Decision Step
In the decision step the solver pulls the next variable from the variable queue,
splits up its current interval and assigns it with the new result. In general two
different cases have to be considered: the variable is of Boolean type or not. Since
the interval of a Boolean variable is defined as [0,1], the result of the interval
split is always a point. In the current implementation of MEMICS all Boolean
variables are assigned to zero in the decision step. For all other variable types,
also two different cases have to be considered: if the variable is contained in a
relational clause or not. In case the variable x – with the current interval [a,b] –
is not contained in a conditional clause, its interval is split to [(ba)/2,b], per
default. If the variable is on the other hand contained in a conditional clause,
the solver differs between the following two clause types:
I. (x relop y) or II. x := (y relop z).
I. Assume the variable to decide is x. This deduces a new interval for x such
that the truth-value of the relation relop is fulfilled. This might possibly also
result in a new interval for the variable y .
II. The solver has to consider two different variants: a) the variable to decide is
on the left-hand side, or b) the variable is on the right-hand side.
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a) In this case the variable x can be treated as a simple Boolean variable.
Hence, no matter what truth-value the solver assigns to x, the following
has to hold:
(x)ô (y relop z)
In addition this implies the resulting new intervals for y and z in order to
match the truth-value of the left-hand side.
b) In this case the variable itself has to be treated like in case I.. In addition
also the resulting value for the Boolean variable x has to be retrieved.
3.4.3 Arithmetic Runtime Errors
As illustrated in Table 2.3, MEMICS currently detects the arithmetic runtime
errors: division by zero, overflow and underflow. Therefore, the solver checks
at each division, if the interval of the dividend contains the zero, and raises
respectively an error. For the detection of an over- or underflow, the solver logs
each arithmetic operation of type signed integer, if an upper or respectively
lower wrap around occurs.
3.4.4 Memory Runtime Errors
The detection of a double free error is also handled by the malloc and free
tables, which have been introduced in Subsection 3.4.2.1. A tracking entry of the
free table can only be deleted from the table, if the solver backtracks past the
free operation. In case the solver detects that the memory region to be freed is
currently not allocated and has already been freed, a double free error is thrown.
For the detection of an invalid free error, the solver uses the internal malloc
table. In case the base address to be freed is not trackable in the malloc table
and is not covered by a double free error, the solver throws an invalid free error.
Each memory address located inside the virtual memory of MEMICS, con-
tains a flag, which states whether the memory behind the address is currently
null or not. This flag is used by the solver to identify null dereference errors.
The error class sizeof on pointers covers a very nasty programming error. A
sizeof operation on a pointer only returns the size of the pointer itself, which
in case of a 32-bit machine is 4 bytes. Though, e. g., the structure behind the
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pointer contains an int32, a double and an int8, the actual size of this structure is
13 byte or depending on the internal alignment, e. g., 16 byte. Hence, the actual
error is usually a corrupt memory problem, since the access of an element in
the structure, exceeds the allocated memory region.
The use after free error detection is using the free table in combination with
the null flag of a memory address. In case the current propagation step acquires
access to a memory region, which is currently null and in addition has been
freed, the solver throws a use after free error.
3.4.5 Pointer Arithmetic Errors
The runtime error invalid range covers e. g., the basic error index out of bounds.
Since MEMICS is operating directly on assembly code, it is not possible to
identify exactly an index out of bounds error, because the actual access of the
error is a basic null dereference. Though it correctly detects all of them.
Also the detection of the runtime error class pointer scaling, is covered by the
memory null flag. A common error for this class is e. g.:
int *p = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int)); int8 *p2 = (int8*)(p+1); *p2 = 1;
In this example, the programmer allocates an int pointer (p) and wants to assign
the second byte inside p to an int8 pointer. However, the cast statement assigns
p2 with the address pointing to the first byte behind the memory region of p.
This can lead to a null dereference.
3.4.6 Concurrent Runtime Errors
In order to detect locking errors, the user must define for the solver, which func-
tion is representing the locking mechanism. With this information the solver is
able to detect a dead lock scenario among two and more different tasks. When-
ever a task acquires a lock of a resource, the solver logs the task and the locked
resource in an internal table. This log entry is deleted once the corresponding
unlock routine is called. For the identification of a dead lock the following rule
must hold:
Dtaski , task j :
lock(resk , taski )^ lock(resl , task j )^ req_lock(resl , taski )^ req_lock(resk , task j )
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This rule is extendable to a variable number of tasks and an arbitrary complexity
among the interleavings of locked resources. For the detection of a double lock
error, the following rule must hold:
Dtaski : lock(resk , taski )^ req_lock(resk , taski )
The error detection of a race condition including a lost update (non-repeatable-
read) is achieved via a table, in which all accesses to the internal memory are
logged. An entry in this table is defined as:
(<memory address> ; <access type> ; <task> ; <clk_cycle>)
Using this table, MEMICS is then able to identify the concurrent error classes:
non-repeatable-read, read-after-write and write-after-write. In order to identify
such an error, the corresponding rule from Table 3.12 must hold.
Table 3.12. Rules for the Detection of Concurrent Runtime Errors
Error: Rule:
non-repeatable-read
(adrr ; r;taski ;clkk )^ (adrs ; r;taski ;clkl )^
(adrt ;w;task j ;clkm)^adrr = adrs = adrt^
clkl clkk ¤ cycle_time(taski )^
clkk < clkm ¤ clkl
read-after-write
(adrr ; r;taski ;clkk )^ (adrs ;w;task j ;clkl )^
adrr = adrs^clkl clkk ¤ cycle_time(taski )^
clkk < clkl
write-after-write
(adrr ;w;taski ;clkk )^ (adrs ;w;task j ;clkl )^
adrr = adrs^clkl clkk ¤ cycle_time(taski )^
clkk < clkl
The cycle_time defines one execution cycle of a task, including its wait-cycles
in case it is preemptive. According to the rules a non-repeatable-read error is
detected, if one task (taski ) is reading a resource (adrr ) at two different times
(clkk and clkl ) within one cycle and a second task (task j ) is writing to the same
resource in between these two reads. A read-after-write error is raised, whenever
there exists a task (taski ), which is reading a resource (adrr ) at time (clkk ), and
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there exists another task (task j ), which has written to the same resource in the
current execution cycle of taski before the time-point clkk . The solver identifies
a write-after-write error, if there exist the two tasks (taski and task j ), which are
both writing to the same resource and the time-point of these two accesses
occurs in the intersection of both execution cycles.
The error detection of type missing synchronization, also requires the defini-
tion of the used synchronization functionality. With this information, the solver
checks at each access to global memory, whether before and after the access,
the corresponding synchronization methods are called.
3.4.7 Analysis Modes
The MEMICS software verification approach features two different operating
modes:
 On the fly Analysis, and
 Target driven Analysis.
These two modes are introduced in the following.
3.4.7.1 On the fly Analysis
The operation mode: “On the fly Analysis” is the default mode of MEMICS. In this
mode, MEMICS starts the search for any type of runtime error at the entry point
the user has specified (per default, the main function). Unless MEMICS finds any
error, it traverses over all possible branches reachable from the given root. In case
of concurrent code, this includes also all permutations of possible interleavings
among tasks. Note that the number of possible interleavings is limited by the
priority of the tasks, as defined in Section 3.3. If MEMICS identifies any type
of error, it immediately stops and notifies the user of the finding. In case the
user asked for the detailed path, MEMICS provides it in addition to the error
description and location.
3.4.7.2 Target driven Analysis
In Target driven Analysis mode, the user has to specify a certain target or
property MEMICS has to check. Compared to the default mode, MEMICS only
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searches those branches, on which the target is reachable from the root node.
The user can in addition configure, whether he or she wants MEMICS to stop
and report errors, it finds on those paths, before reaching the actual target. In
case the user disables this option, it can be possible that MEMICS reports a
target reachable, which is only possible due to an error in the code before.
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Tests and Results
MEMICS has been tested on a various number of benchmarks, in order to check
its correctness against several types of runtime errors. One benchmark suite at
Daimler is based on runtime errors met in an industrial context, which is used
to evaluate static software analysis tools. In the first tests, MEMICS had to suc-
cessfully verify all those benchmarks covering the runtime errors from Table 2.3.
MEMICS passed this test successfully. The results of MEMICS competing against
several state of the art tools from the software verification competition [89] in
2013 (SV-Comp13) are shown in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 introduces the results of
MEMICS for the running automotive Example 2.3.1.
4.1 Comparison against State of the Art Tools
In this section MEMICS has to compete against several state of the art tools
on categories from the SV-Comp13. All the problems used in this competition
are constructed as reachability problems – except for the category memory
safety. For this purpose the label “ERROR” has been introduced, which has to be
reached in case of an unsafe test case. Otherwise the tool has to prove the non-
reachability of this label. Since, MEMICS and almost any of the competing tools
are working based on a BMC approach the reachability analysis over infinite
loops has to be treated with care. Real safety in terms of non-reachability of an
error region can not be guaranteed by pure BMC. Such an approach can only
ensure safety up to a fixed depth.
All results presented in this section have been obtained from runs on a
machine with the Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-3517U CPU running at 1.9GHz and 10GB
of RAM. The operating system is Ubuntu [90] version 13.10. Therefore, all the
competitive tools have been downloaded from the competition web page. This
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guaranties a fair competition among the tools. Please note, the results obtained
during these tests differ from the results published on the website of the SV-
Comp13 for some benchmarks.
Feature Checks The feature checks category covers all kind of checks for com-
mon runtime errors in C source code – from basic assertions, memory allocation
and so on towards nested switch statements. Figure 4.1 shows the runtime results
and Figure 4.2 the memory consumption of the tools.
Note that the y-axis is in logarithmic scale. The runtime chart shows that
MEMICS competes well against the other tools and is among the fastest. Though,
in three test cases it needed a lot more time to solve the benchmark. These three
benchmarks (stateful*) implement a loop over an undetermined iterator. The
loop-body contains a switch statement, with four cases. The ERROR label is only
reachable over the path, visiting each of these cases in a certain order. Since the
current path iteration algorithm inside MEMICS is working based on breadth
first search, MEMICS spends a lot of time on finding the correct path to the
ERROR label.
Regarding the memory consumption of MEMICS the same results can be
observed from the image. Except those three benchmarks, the memory con-
sumption of the current implementation of MEMICS is in the average field of its
competitors.
Though, MEMICS is not the fastest according to the runtime performance,
it is the only tool able to successfully solve all the benchmarks in this category.
With regard to soundness, MEMICS wins this category. This overall result is
shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1. Overall Results of the Category Feature Checks from the Software Verification
Competition 2013
blast esbmc llbmc memics predator
Score (%): 84.0 83.0 98.0 100.0 87.0
Time (s): 471.02 41.83 7.94 101.23 13.44
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Figure 4.1. Performance Comparison between MEMICS and several State of the Art Tools
for the Category Feature Checks: Runtime
85
4. Tests and Results
 1
 10
 100
 1000
 10000
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 90
 100
RAM (MB)
Benchm
arks
M
em
ory Com
parison
blast
e
sbm
c
llbm
c
m
e
m
ics
predator
Figure 4.2. Performance Comparison between MEMICS and several State of the Art Tools
for the Category Feature Checks: Memory Consumption
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The detailed results of this category are shown in Table 4.2. The first block
covers the pure C source files, whereas the second block contains source files,
based on the same benchmarks, but these files are already preprocessed by
a compiler. This preprocessing leads to additional information in the input
source files, which may be responsible in the differences of the results for one
benchmark by the same tool.
Table 4.2. Detailed Results of the Category Feature Checks from the Software Verification
Competition 2013
blast esbmc llbmc memics predator
Benchmark Result Time Result Time Result Time Result Time Result Time
1_3.c_unsafe.cil.c unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.39 unsafe 2.3 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.06
alias_of_return_2.c_safe_1.cil.c safe 0.03 safe 0.38 safe 0.08 safe 0.03 safe 0.09
alias_of_return_2.c_safe.cil.c safe 0.01 safe 0.52 safe 0.04 safe 0.02 safe 0.08
alias_of_return.c_safe_1.cil.c safe 0.02 safe 0.2 safe 0.06 safe 0.02 safe 0.07
alias_of_return.c_safe.cil.c safe 0.01 safe 0.2 safe 0.04 safe 0.02 safe 0.06
alt_test.c_unsafe.cil.c unsafe 1.65 unsafe 0.39 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.04 unknown 0.36
callfpointer.c_unsafe.cil.c unsafe 0.03 unsafe 0.2 unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.02 unsafe 0.04
ex3_forlist.c_safe.cil.c error 322.74 safe 0.44 safe 0.11 safe 0.06 safe 0.96
fo_test.c_unsafe.cil.c unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.37 unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.04
just_assert.c_safe.cil.c safe 0.02 safe 0.2 safe 0.06 safe 0.01 safe 0.1
mutex_lock_int.c_safe_1.cil.c safe 0.01 safe 0.2 safe 0.04 safe 0.03 safe 0.09
mutex_lock_int.c_unsafe.cil.c unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.34 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.03 unsafe 0.04
mutex_lock_struct.c_safe_1.cil.c safe 0.02 safe 0.18 safe 0.04 safe 0.02 safe 0.08
mutex_lock_struct.c_unsafe.cil.c unsafe 0.03 unsafe 0.34 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.03 unsafe 0.05
nested_structure.c_safe.cil.c safe 0.01 safe 0.2 safe 0.03 safe 0.02 safe 0.08
nested_structure_noptr.c_safe.cil.c safe 0.01 safe 0.18 safe 0.04 safe 0.02 safe 0.08
nested_structure_noptr_safe.c safe 0.01 safe 0.2 safe 0.06 safe 0.02 safe 0.09
nested_structure_noptr_safe.cil.c safe 0.01 safe 0.21 safe 0.04 safe 0.01 safe 0.08
nested_structure_ptr.c_safe.cil.c safe 0.01 safe 0.21 safe 0.04 safe 0.02 safe 0.09
nested_structure_ptr_safe.c safe 0.01 safe 0.21 safe 0.05 safe 0.04 safe 0.07
nested_structure_ptr_safe.cil.c unsafe 0.06 unsafe 0.22 safe 0.05 safe 0.03 unknown 0.85
nested_structure_safe.c safe 0.01 safe 0.22 safe 0.05 safe 0.02 safe 0.08
nested_structure_safe.cil.c unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.19 safe 0.05 safe 0.02 unknown 0.47
oomInt.c_safe_1.cil.c safe 0.02 safe 0.21 safe 0.06 safe 0.02 safe 0.09
oomInt.c_safe.cil.c safe 0.01 safe 0.34 safe 0.06 safe 0.03 safe 0.08
recursive_list.c_unsafe.cil.c unsafe 0.07 unsafe 0.45 unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.04 unknown 0.08
rule57_ebda_blast.c_safe_1.cil.c safe 1.81 safe 0.23 safe 0.09 safe 0.05 unknown 0.26
rule57_ebda_blast.c_unsafe.cil.c unsafe 0.06 unsafe 0.3 unsafe 0.09 unsafe 0.06 unknown 0.29
rule60_list2.c_safe.cil.c safe 5.71 safe 0.25 safe 0.06 safe 0.05 safe 0.63
rule60_list2.c_unsafe_1.cil.c unsafe 6.73 unsafe 0.24 unsafe 0.07 unsafe 0.08 unsafe 0.66
rule60_list.c_safe.cil.c safe 0.04 unsafe 0.36 safe 0.07 safe 0.04 unknown 0.21
sizeofparameters_test.c_safe.cil.c safe 0.02 safe 0.19 safe 0.06 safe 0.02 safe 0.06
stateful_check_unsafe.c unsafe 1.07 unsafe 0.64 unsafe 0.22 unsafe 41.99 unsafe 0.05
stateful_check_unsafe.cil.c unsafe 1.25 unsafe 0.4 unsafe 0.17 unsafe 14.65 unsafe 0.04
structure_assignment.c_safe.cil.c safe 0.01 safe 0.19 safe 0.04 safe 0.03 safe 0.07
test_address.c_safe.cil.c unsafe 0.03 safe 0.21 safe 0.05 safe 0.02 unknown 0.21
test_cut_trace.c_safe.cil.c safe 0.02 safe 0.31 safe 0.06 safe 0.02 safe 0.1
test_malloc-1_safe.c unsafe 0.03 safe 0.74 error 0.09 safe 0.05 safe 0.23
test_malloc-1_safe.cil.c unsafe 0.04 safe 0.52 safe 0.06 safe 0.02 unknown 0.47
test_malloc-2_safe.c unsafe 0.03 safe 0.61 error 0.09 safe 0.04 safe 0.09
test_malloc-2_safe.cil.c unsafe 0.03 safe 0.21 safe 0.06 safe 0.03 unknown 0.45
test_overflow.c_safe.cil.c safe 0.02 safe 0.21 safe 0.04 safe 0.02 safe 0.07
test_union_cast-1_safe.c safe 0.02 error 0.06 safe 0.05 safe 0.02 safe 0.1
test_union_cast-1_safe.cil.c safe 0.01 error 0.05 safe 0.06 safe 0.02 safe 0.06
test_union_cast-2_safe.c safe 0.01 error 0.06 safe 0.05 safe 0.02 safe 0.07
test_union_cast-2_safe.cil.c safe 0.01 error 0.06 safe 0.04 safe 0.02 safe 0.09
test_union_cast.c_safe_1.cil.c safe 0.01 error 0.05 safe 0.04 safe 0.02 safe 0.09
test_union_cast.c_safe.cil.c safe 0.01 error 0.05 safe 0.04 safe 0.03 safe 0.08
87
4. Tests and Results
test_union.c_safe_1.cil.c unsafe 0.03 safe 0.35 safe 0.04 safe 0.01 safe 0.07
test_union.c_safe.cil.c safe 0.02 safe 0.21 safe 0.04 safe 0.01 safe 0.07
test_while_int.c_unsafe_1.cil.c unsafe 0.8 unsafe 0.47 unsafe 0.06 unsafe 0.02 unsafe 0.04
test_while_int.c_unsafe.cil.c unsafe 0.96 safe 0.29 unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.03 unsafe 0.04
volatile_alias.c_safe_1.cil.c safe 0.02 safe 0.2 safe 0.04 safe 0.01 safe 0.08
volatile_alias.c_safe.cil.c safe 0.03 safe 0.2 safe 0.04 safe 0.01 safe 0.08
1_3.c_unsafe.i unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.29 unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.03 unsafe 0.11
alias_of_return_2.c_safe_1.i safe 0.02 safe 0.13 safe 0.05 safe 0.02 safe 0.07
alias_of_return_2.c_safe.i safe 0.01 safe 0.14 safe 0.04 safe 0.02 safe 0.09
alias_of_return.c_safe_1.i safe 0.01 safe 0.24 safe 0.05 safe 0.02 safe 0.09
alias_of_return.c_safe.i safe 0.01 safe 0.25 safe 0.04 safe 0.02 safe 0.09
alt_test.c_unsafe.i unsafe 1.25 unsafe 0.45 unsafe 0.07 unsafe 0.07 unsafe 0.04
callfpointer.c_unsafe.i unsafe 0.04 error 0.06 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.02 unsafe 0.04
ex3_forlist.c_safe.i error 114.21 safe 0.17 safe 0.07 safe 0.04 safe 0.17
fo_test.c_unsafe.i unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.49 unsafe 0.09 unsafe 0.06 unsafe 0.05
just_assert.c_safe.i safe 0.02 safe 0.13 safe 0.04 safe 0.01 safe 0.07
mutex_lock_int.c_safe_1.i safe 0.01 safe 0.15 safe 0.04 safe 0.02 safe 0.07
mutex_lock_int.c_unsafe.i unsafe 0.03 unsafe 0.3 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.02 unsafe 0.04
mutex_lock_struct.c_safe_1.i safe 0.02 safe 0.15 safe 0.04 safe 0.02 safe 0.06
mutex_lock_struct.c_unsafe.i unsafe 0.03 unsafe 0.15 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.03 unsafe 0.04
nested_structure.c_safe.i safe 0.02 safe 0.13 safe 0.04 safe 0.04 safe 0.08
nested_structure_noptr.c_safe.i safe 0.01 safe 0.13 safe 0.04 safe 0.02 safe 0.06
nested_structure_noptr_safe.i safe 0.01 safe 0.14 safe 0.04 safe 0.04 safe 0.07
nested_structure_ptr.c_safe.i safe 0.02 safe 0.34 safe 0.04 safe 0.02 safe 0.08
nested_structure_ptr_safe.i safe 0.01 safe 0.14 safe 0.05 safe 0.02 safe 0.08
nested_structure_safe.i safe 0.01 safe 0.15 safe 0.04 safe 0.02 safe 0.1
oomInt.c_safe_1.i safe 0.01 safe 0.14 safe 0.05 safe 0.02 safe 0.09
oomInt.c_safe.i safe 0.01 safe 0.4 safe 0.05 safe 0.02 safe 0.06
recursive_list.c_unsafe.i unsafe 0.08 unsafe 0.3 unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.03 unknown 0.06
rule57_ebda_blast.c_safe_1.i safe 1.2 safe 0.17 safe 0.06 safe 0.05 safe 0.38
rule57_ebda_blast.c_unsafe.i unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.17 unsafe 0.06 unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.18
rule60_list2.c_safe.i safe 3.26 safe 0.4 safe 0.07 safe 0.06 safe 0.1
rule60_list2.c_unsafe_1.i unsafe 3.37 unsafe 0.54 unsafe 0.07 unsafe 0.1 unsafe 0.05
rule60_list.c_safe.i safe 0.03 safe 0.39 safe 0.06 safe 0.05 safe 0.35
sizeofparameters_test.c_safe.i unsafe 0.03 unsafe 0.37 safe 0.06 safe 0.03 unsafe 0.04
stateful_check_unsafe.i unsafe 1.11 unsafe 0.93 unsafe 0.25 unsafe 41.66 unsafe 0.04
structure_assignment.c_safe.i safe 0.01 safe 0.14 safe 0.04 safe 0.02 safe 0.06
test_address.c_safe.i unsafe 0.04 safe 0.38 safe 0.06 safe 0.04 safe 0.08
test_cut_trace.c_safe.i safe 0.03 safe 0.14 safe 0.04 safe 0.02 safe 0.09
test_malloc-1_safe.i unsafe 0.04 safe 0.39 safe 0.06 safe 0.05 safe 0.25
test_malloc-2_safe.i unsafe 0.05 safe 0.39 safe 0.06 safe 0.06 safe 0.05
test_overflow.c_safe.i unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.44 safe 0.09 safe 0.06 unsafe 0.09
test_union_cast-1_safe.i safe 0.02 error 0.13 safe 0.04 safe 0.02 safe 0.08
test_union_cast-2_safe.i safe 0.01 error 0.04 safe 0.04 safe 0.02 safe 0.08
test_union_cast.c_safe_1.i safe 0.01 error 0.05 safe 0.05 safe 0.02 safe 0.1
test_union_cast.c_safe.i safe 0.03 error 0.05 safe 0.04 safe 0.02 safe 0.1
test_union.c_safe_1.i unsafe 0.03 safe 0.16 safe 0.04 safe 0.02 safe 0.07
test_union.c_safe.i safe 0.02 safe 0.14 safe 0.05 safe 0.02 safe 0.09
test_while_int.c_unsafe_1.i unsafe 0.82 unsafe 0.29 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.03 unsafe 0.04
test_while_int.c_unsafe.i unsafe 1.03 unsafe 16.02 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.03 unsafe 0.05
volatile_alias.c_safe_1.i safe 0.02 safe 0.14 safe 0.04 safe 0.02 safe 0.08
volatile_alias.c_safe.i safe 0.01 safe 0.14 safe 0.04 safe 0.05 safe 0.26
Loops The loop category of the SV-Comp13 covers all kinds of different bench-
marks. Each benchmark contains at least one loop. The complexity in this cate-
gory is reached by having the calls to the error label hidden somewhere inside
the loop. The deeper this call is inside a loop and in addition with the connection
to some conditions, the more complex the problem is.
Figure 4.3 shows the performance of the tools regarding runtime and Fig-
ure 4.4 shows the comparison regarding memory consumption.
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Figure 4.3. Performance Comparison between MEMICS and several State of the Art Tools
for the Category Loops: Runtime
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Figure 4.4. Performance Comparison between MEMICS and several State of the Art Tools
for the Category Loops: Memory Consumption
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In terms of runtime, MEMICS competes quite well and is in almost any
benchmark at least in average time. Only in a very few cases is MEMICS the tool
with the longest runtime. The same results are observable from the memory
consumption graph.
Again, the timing and memory results are not the actual relevant comparison
criteria. This is the percentage of benchmarks checked with the correct result,
which is shown in Table 4.3. The winner in this category is LLBMC, followed by
ESBMC and MEMICS achieves the third place.
Table 4.3. Overall Results of the Category Loops from the Software Verification Competi-
tion 2013
blast esbmc llbmc memics predator
Score (%): 58.86 91.77 92.41 74.68 60.75
Time (s): 8597.04 13366.28 3426.0 2517.21 540.34
The detailed results of this category are shown in Table 4.4, where the first
block contains the pure C source files and the second block contains prepro-
cessed source code of the same benchmarks.
Table 4.4. Detailed Results of the Category Loops from the Software Verification Competi-
tion 2013
blast esbmc llbmc memics Predator
Benchmark Result Time Result Time Result Time Result Time Result Time
array_safe.c unsafe 0.13 safe 0.31 safe 0.08 safe 0.06 unsafe 0.2
array_unsafe.c unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.48 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.04
bist.cell_safe.c safe 4.05 safe 0.58 safe 8.84 safe 0.34 safe 0.08
bubble_sort_safe.c safe 0.02 safe 0.33 safe 0.08 safe 0.07 unknown 0.1
bubble_sort_unsafe.c error 0.03 error 32.42 unsafe 0.2 unsafe 0.2 unknown 5.47
count_up_down_safe.c unsafe 0.03 unsafe 450.2 safe 0.39 safe 35.66 unsafe 0.04
count_up_down_unsafe.c unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.19 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.04
eureka_01_safe.c timeout 910.0 safe 0.61 safe 0.92 safe 0.26 safe 11.53
eureka_01_unsafe.c timeout 910.0 unsafe 454.6 unsafe 0.59 safe 0.11 unknown 5.43
eureka_05_safe.c error 0.0 safe 0.56 safe 0.15 safe 0.38 safe 0.17
for_bounded_loop1_unsafe.c unsafe 2.67 unsafe 0.86 unsafe 0.03 unsafe 0.03 unsafe 0.04
for_infinite_loop_1_safe.c safe 0.02 safe 0.25 safe 0.28 safe 0.25 safe 0.18
for_infinite_loop_2_safe.c safe 0.01 safe 0.26 safe 0.29 safe 0.24 safe 0.18
insertion_sort_safe.c unsafe 6.78 safe 0.68 timeout 910.0 error 0.13 unknown 0.1
insertion_sort_unsafe.c unsafe 7.5 unsafe 450.47 unsafe 0.35 error 0.15 unknown 0.07
invert_string_safe.c unsafe 3.97 safe 20.68 safe 0.04 safe 0.44 unknown 0.05
invert_string_unsafe.c unsafe 2.54 unsafe 15.73 unsafe 0.14 error 0.15 unknown 0.07
kundu_safe.c error 7.53 safe 583.83 error 17.26 safe 0.2 safe 0.48
kundu_unsafe.c unsafe 538.13 unsafe 2.46 unsafe 0.8 safe 0.17 unsafe 0.05
linear_sea.ch_safe.c unsafe 0.05 safe 0.3 safe 0.94 error 0.13 unknown 0.07
linear_search_unsafe.c unsafe 0.05 safe 450.19 unsafe 0.2 error 0.13 unknown 0.06
list_safe.c error 0.02 safe 0.54 error 0.3 safe 0.11 safe 0.26
list_unsafe.c error 0.02 unsafe 0.42 error 0.11 unsafe 0.1 unsafe 0.05
lu.cmp_safe.c safe 112.94 safe 0.58 safe 0.38 safe 0.23 safe 2.28
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ludcmp_unsafe.c unsafe 4.21 unsafe 450.86 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.2 unsafe 0.05
matrix_safe.c error 0.01 safe 0.48 safe 0.06 safe 0.05 unsafe 0.04
matrix_unsafe.c error 0.01 unsafe 13.38 unsafe 0.05 error 0.14 unknown 0.08
mem_slave_tlm_safe.c safe 215.34 timeout 910.0 error 9.21 safe 0.62 safe 0.11
n.c11_safe.c safe 2.05 safe 0.4 safe 0.29 safe 0.27 safe 0.07
n.c24_safe.c timeout 910.0 error 2.27 error 0.07 safe 0.36 unknown 0.1
n.c40_safe.c error 8.62 safe 0.2 safe 0.03 error 0.13 safe 0.09
nec11_unsafe.c unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.18 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.05
nec20_unsafe.c unsafe 0.47 unsafe 111.9 unsafe 0.03 unsafe 0.05 unknown 0.04
nec40_safe.c unsafe 0.56 safe 0.2 safe 0.05 error 0.14 safe 0.08
pc_sfifo_1_safe.c safe 32.55 safe 466.98 safe 164.52 safe 0.34 unsafe 0.08
pc_sfifo_2_unsafe.c unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.29 unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.14 unsafe 0.04
s3_unsafe.c unsafe 57.42 safe 18.42 unsafe 128.39 safe 126.37 unknown 0.05
string_safe.c error 0.02 safe 1.59 safe 0.54 safe 0.24 unknown 0.1
string_unsafe.c error 0.01 unsafe 0.45 unsafe 0.07 unsafe 0.09 unknown 0.04
sum01_bug02_sum01_bug02_base.case_-
unsafe.c
error 0.01 unsafe 2.34 unsafe 0.15 unsafe 0.07 unsafe 0.03
sum01_bug02_unsafe.c error 0.01 unsafe 2.92 unsafe 0.24 unsafe 0.1 unsafe 0.04
sum01_safe.c error 0.01 safe 0.24 safe 0.37 safe 36.44 unsafe 0.04
sum01_unsafe.c error 0.02 unsafe 6.15 unsafe 0.36 unsafe 0.17 unsafe 0.05
sum02_safe.c error 0.25 safe 0.27 safe 0.48 safe 40.0 unsafe 0.04
sum03_safe.c error 0.01 safe 0.22 safe 0.29 safe 0.25 unsafe 0.04
sum03_unsafe.c error 0.01 unsafe 3.72 unsafe 0.28 unsafe 0.06 unsafe 0.04
sum04_safe.c error 0.01 safe 0.22 safe 0.04 safe 0.04 safe 0.07
sum04_unsafe.c error 0.01 unsafe 0.23 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.04
sum_array_safe.c unsafe 1.47 safe 0.35 safe 19.43 error 0.14 unknown 0.06
sum_array_unsafe.c unsafe 1.29 unsafe 369.46 unsafe 0.05 error 0.14 unknown 0.07
terminator_01_safe.c error 0.0 safe 0.23 safe 0.31 safe 0.03 safe 0.06
terminator_01_unsafe.c unsafe 0.03 unsafe 0.21 unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.03 unsafe 0.05
terminator_02_safe.c safe 2.26 safe 0.2 safe 0.05 safe 1.25 safe 0.1
terminator_02_unsafe.c unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.21 unsafe 0.03 unsafe 0.03 unsafe 0.04
terminator_03_safe.c safe 1.07 safe 0.26 safe 0.55 safe 6.01 safe 0.06
terminator_03_unsafe.c unsafe 0.29 unsafe 0.2 unsafe 0.04 error 448.0 unsafe 0.03
token_ring01_safe.c safe 4.84 safe 456.0 safe 394.28 safe 0.32 unsafe 0.05
token_ring01_unsafe.c unsafe 248.61 unsafe 0.86 unsafe 0.2 safe 1.04 unsafe 0.12
toy_safe.c error 79.0 timeout 910.0 error 44.04 safe 0.4 error 447.0
transmitter_unsafe.c unsafe 2.02 unsafe 3.92 unsafe 0.13 unsafe 0.17 unsafe 0.07
trex01_safe.c safe 2.34 safe 0.31 safe 0.4 safe 1.66 unsafe 0.04
trex01_unsafe.c unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.19 unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.01
trex02_safe.c safe 0.26 safe 0.24 safe 0.51 safe 0.83 safe 0.03
trex02_unsafe.c unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.22 unsafe 0.06 safe 620.41 unsafe 0.02
trex03_safe.c unsafe 0.05 safe 0.27 safe 1.23 safe 0.66 safe 0.03
trex03_unsafe.c error 0.01 unsafe 0.2 unsafe 0.07 unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.02
trex04_safe.c error 0.01 safe 0.25 safe 0.67 safe 0.91 safe 0.04
veris.c_NetBSD-libc__loop_safe.c error 0.01 safe 0.22 safe 0.09 safe 0.03 safe 0.03
veris.c_OpenSER__cases1_stripFullBoth_-
arr_safe.c
error 0.01 safe 1.85 safe 2.01 safe 0.06 unknown 0.18
veris.c_sendmail__tTflag_arr_one_loop_-
safe.c
safe 0.63 safe 0.34 safe 0.29 safe 0.04 unknown 0.2
verisec_NetBSD-libc__loop_unsafe.c error 0.01 unsafe 0.4 unsafe 0.16 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.05
verisec_OpenSER__cases1_stripFullBoth_-
arr_unsafe.c
error 0.01 unsafe 0.37 unsafe 0.19 error 0.19 unknown 0.18
verisec_sendmail__tTflag_arr_one_loop_-
unsafe.c
safe 0.43 unsafe 3.67 unsafe 0.68 safe 0.05 unsafe 0.08
vogal_safe.c error 0.02 safe 0.27 safe 0.24 error 0.16 unknown 0.14
vogal_unsafe.c error 0.01 unsafe 3.67 unsafe 0.05 error 0.52 unsafe 0.08
while_infinite_loop_1_safe.c safe 0.02 safe 0.21 safe 0.29 safe 0.24 safe 0.09
while_infinite_loop_2_safe.c safe 0.02 safe 0.22 safe 0.27 safe 0.24 safe 0.1
while_infinite_loop_3_safe.c safe 0.01 safe 0.21 safe 0.31 safe 0.26 safe 0.2
while_infinite_loop_4_unsafe.c unsafe 0.03 unsafe 0.19 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.03 unsafe 0.04
array_safe.i unsafe 0.05 safe 0.39 safe 0.07 safe 0.04 unsafe 0.04
array_unsafe.i unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.38 unsafe 0.06 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.03
bist.cell_safe.i safe 4.01 safe 0.57 safe 9.01 safe 0.34 safe 0.08
bubble_sort_safe.i safe 0.02 safe 0.26 safe 0.05 safe 0.05 unknown 0.06
bubble_sort_unsafe.i error 0.03 unsafe 33.57 unsafe 0.09 unsafe 0.21 unknown 5.72
count_up_down_safe.i unsafe 0.03 unsafe 450.18 safe 0.39 safe 36.66 unsafe 0.05
count_up_down_unsafe.i unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.14 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.05
eureka_01_safe.i error 561.03 safe 0.54 safe 0.98 safe 0.25 safe 10.87
eureka_01_unsafe.i error 87.0 unsafe 454.47 unsafe 0.61 safe 0.1 unknown 5.27
eureka_05_safe.i error 45.8 safe 0.39 safe 0.22 safe 0.37 safe 0.18
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for_bounded_loop1_unsafe.i unsafe 1.55 unsafe 0.15 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.04
for_infinite_loop_1_safe.i safe 0.02 safe 0.14 safe 0.23 safe 0.24 safe 0.17
for_infinite_loop_2_safe.i safe 0.01 safe 0.14 safe 0.29 safe 0.24 safe 0.16
insertion_sort_safe.i unsafe 37.36 safe 0.5 error 33.15 error 0.14 unknown 0.09
insertion_sort_unsafe.i unsafe 11.15 unsafe 450.37 unsafe 0.33 error 0.14 unknown 0.05
invert_string_safe.i unsafe 3.45 safe 19.05 safe 0.04 safe 0.45 unknown 0.04
invert_string_unsafe.i unsafe 1.46 unsafe 13.68 unsafe 0.14 error 0.15 unknown 0.07
kundu_safe.i error 4.32 safe 585.96 error 8.1 safe 0.19 safe 0.51
kundu_unsafe.i unsafe 414.55 unsafe 2.37 unsafe 0.8 safe 0.16 unsafe 0.08
linear_sea.ch_safe.i unsafe 0.06 safe 0.24 safe 0.94 error 0.14 unknown 0.08
linear_search_unsafe.i unsafe 0.03 safe 450.19 unsafe 0.2 error 0.14 unknown 0.08
list_safe.i unsafe 0.07 safe 0.54 safe 0.16 safe 0.12 safe 0.23
list_unsafe.i unsafe 0.06 unsafe 0.45 unsafe 0.11 unsafe 0.09 unsafe 0.04
lu.cmp_safe.i safe 119.41 safe 0.81 safe 0.42 safe 0.23 safe 2.32
ludcmp_unsafe.i unsafe 2.64 unsafe 451.18 unsafe 0.06 unsafe 0.24 unsafe 0.05
matrix_safe.i error 0.01 safe 0.31 safe 0.07 safe 0.06 unsafe 0.04
matrix_unsafe.i error 0.01 unsafe 22.21 unsafe 0.06 error 0.14 unknown 0.07
mem_slave_tlm_safe.i safe 117.7 timeout 910.0 error 92.17 safe 0.63 safe 0.12
n.c11_safe.i safe 1.21 safe 0.35 safe 0.28 safe 0.31 safe 0.07
n.c24_safe.i error 91.0 error 2.4 unknown 87.0 safe 0.39 unknown 0.08
n.c40_safe.i error 9.27 safe 0.13 safe 2.66 error 0.16 safe 0.06
nec11_unsafe.i unsafe 0.06 unsafe 0.16 unsafe 0.08 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.04
nec20_unsafe.i unsafe 0.55 unsafe 122.6 unsafe 0.13 unsafe 0.05 unknown 0.04
nec40_safe.i unsafe 0.78 safe 0.17 safe 0.08 error 0.15 safe 0.07
pc_sfifo_1_safe.i safe 33.67 safe 467.35 safe 159.72 safe 0.36 unsafe 0.09
pc_sfifo_2_unsafe.i unsafe 0.08 unsafe 0.28 unsafe 0.08 unsafe 0.14 unsafe 0.05
s3_unsafe.i unsafe 57.82 safe 18.68 unsafe 129.62 safe 129.65 unknown 0.06
string_safe.i safe 1.97 safe 450.25 safe 0.57 safe 0.3 unknown 0.1
string_unsafe.i unsafe 4.12 unsafe 0.38 unsafe 0.07 unsafe 0.11 unknown 0.04
sum01_bug02_sum01_bug02_base.case_-
unsafe.i
unsafe 15.83 unsafe 2.35 unsafe 0.18 unsafe 0.1 unsafe 0.04
sum01_bug02_unsafe.i unsafe 32.5 unsafe 3.13 unsafe 0.25 unsafe 0.13 unsafe 0.04
sum01_safe.i safe 1.98 safe 0.23 safe 0.38 safe 36.29 unsafe 0.04
sum01_unsafe.i unsafe 49.58 unsafe 7.77 unsafe 0.36 unsafe 0.18 unsafe 0.05
sum02_safe.i error 0.25 safe 0.25 safe 0.53 safe 39.36 unsafe 0.04
sum03_safe.i safe 0.33 safe 0.18 safe 0.31 safe 0.29 unsafe 0.04
sum03_unsafe.i unsafe 9.71 unsafe 4.56 unsafe 0.24 unsafe 0.08 unsafe 0.04
sum04_safe.i safe 1.69 safe 0.24 safe 0.06 safe 0.05 safe 0.07
sum04_unsafe.i unsafe 1.93 unsafe 0.24 unsafe 0.06 unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.04
sum_array_safe.i unsafe 0.98 safe 0.34 safe 19.49 error 0.15 unknown 0.08
sum_array_unsafe.i unsafe 1.52 unsafe 378.05 unsafe 0.06 error 0.14 unknown 0.08
terminator_01_safe.i error 0.0 safe 0.16 safe 0.25 safe 0.04 safe 0.07
terminator_01_unsafe.i unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.13 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.03
terminator_02_safe.i safe 2.12 safe 0.2 safe 0.04 safe 1.27 safe 0.06
terminator_02_unsafe.i unsafe 0.03 unsafe 0.28 unsafe 0.06 unsafe 0.06 unsafe 0.04
terminator_03_safe.i safe 0.56 safe 0.55 safe 0.56 safe 5.98 safe 0.1
terminator_03_unsafe.i unsafe 0.29 unsafe 0.15 unsafe 0.09 error 616.71 unsafe 0.04
token_ring01_safe.i safe 4.88 safe 455.99 safe 404.87 safe 0.33 unsafe 0.05
token_ring01_unsafe.i unsafe 245.51 unsafe 0.82 unsafe 0.26 safe 1.07 unsafe 0.12
toy_safe.i error 623.1 timeout 910.0 error 746.0 safe 0.4 error 32.2
transmitter_unsafe.i unsafe 2.16 unsafe 5.63 unsafe 0.18 unsafe 0.19 unsafe 0.06
trex01_safe.i safe 2.4 safe 0.29 safe 0.37 safe 1.68 unsafe 0.06
trex01_unsafe.i unsafe 0.07 unsafe 0.17 unsafe 0.06 unsafe 0.06 unsafe 0.05
trex02_safe.i safe 0.32 safe 0.2 safe 0.52 safe 0.83 safe 0.09
trex02_unsafe.i unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.16 unsafe 0.08 error 304.88 unsafe 0.04
trex03_safe.i unsafe 0.05 safe 0.22 safe 1.21 safe 0.68 safe 0.09
trex03_unsafe.i unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.8 unsafe 0.08 unsafe 0.08 unsafe 0.04
trex04_safe.i safe 1.15 safe 0.56 safe 0.7 safe 0.94 safe 0.09
veris.c_NetBSD-libc__loop_safe.i safe 0.48 safe 0.16 safe 0.11 safe 0.06 safe 0.07
veris.c_OpenSER__cases1_stripFullBoth_-
arr_safe.i
safe 0.03 safe 2.3 safe 1.96 safe 0.07 unknown 0.11
veris.c_sendmail__tTflag_arr_one_loop_-
safe.i
safe 0.66 safe 0.41 safe 0.29 safe 0.07 unknown 0.24
verisec_NetBSD-libc__loop_unsafe.i unsafe 1.43 unsafe 0.22 unsafe 0.15 unsafe 0.05 unsafe 0.05
verisec_OpenSER__cases1_stripFullBoth_-
arr_unsafe.i
unsafe 79.07 unsafe 0.47 unsafe 0.23 error 0.16 unknown 0.18
verisec_sendmail__tTflag_arr_one_loop_-
unsafe.i
safe 0.58 unsafe 6.16 unsafe 0.69 safe 0.05 unsafe 0.07
vogal_safe.i timeout 910.0 safe 450.31 safe 0.32 error 0.14 unknown 0.13
vogal_unsafe.i timeout 910.0 unsafe 3.42 unsafe 0.08 error 0.51 unsafe 0.07
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while_infinite_loop_1_safe.i safe 0.02 safe 0.15 safe 0.22 safe 0.23 safe 0.18
while_infinite_loop_2_safe.i safe 0.01 safe 0.15 safe 0.28 safe 0.23 safe 0.2
while_infinite_loop_3_safe.i safe 0.01 safe 0.16 safe 0.27 safe 0.27 safe 0.2
while_infinite_loop_4_unsafe.i unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.15 unsafe 0.08 unsafe 0.04 unsafe 0.04
While this result is already good for a proof-of-concept implementation,
one thing has to be mentioned regarding the remaining benchmarks, which
MEMICS was not able to verify successfully. The benchmarks: insertion_sort*,
invert_string*, linear_search*, matrix_unsafe, sum_array*, and verisec_-
sendmail contain at least one dynamic array, which is constructed based on an
undefined, unsigned integer value. Since MEMICS is working based on intervals,
this requires the allocation of an array of size [0,2321]. This is currently not
supported, because it leads to a huge memory consumption in MEMICS and can
possibly influence its stability. In the future however, MEMICS is going to be able
to deal with dynamic arrays, but they will have to be defined on proper bounds
– i. e., using assumptions for the bounds. The benchmarks nec40_safe* and
n.c_safe* both contain uninitialized arrays of fixed size. In both cases one of
these arrays is accessed under the condition while (array[i++] != 0). Since
the array is uninitialized it can be possible that there exists a 0 inside the array.
But on the other hand, it is not guaranteed, which results in an index out of
bounds access to the array. MEMICS terminates exactly with the identification of
this error, because the main purpose of MEMICS is the discovery of any runtime
error.
4.2 The Automotive Race Condition Example
In this section MEMICS is applied to the running automotive race condition
Example 2.3.1. In Figure 4.5 the result of a run is shown, where the number of
pixels has been set to 500.
The runtime error identified by MEMICS is exactly the race condition (lost
update) between the computation of the Laplace Operator for the first pixel
and the update of the last pixel from the internal image buffer. For the entire
operation, MEMICS is running about half an hour. Though, this might sound
long, it states that the current proof-of-concept implementation of MEMICS is
very stable.
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user@memics:~/$ memics automotive-example.c -c automotive-example.conf
Model is Unsafe
Runtime error: lost update
thrown from task/thread: readInputs
present in file: /home/user/automotive-example.c @ line 31
sensor_values[i] = readSensors(i);
^
in conflict with task/thread: worker1
present in file: /home/user/automotive-example.c @ line 49
tmp[i] = sensors[left(i, NUM_SENSORS)] - 2*sensors[i] + sensors[right(i, NUM_SENSORS)];
^
Figure 4.5. The Result Output of MEMICS after Solving the Automotive Example 2.3.1
To properly test MEMICS on scalability, using the automotive example, the
number of pixels (sensors) has been varied from 3 up to 2000. Figure 4.6 shows
the results of MEMICS for the first 500 benchmarks. The overall runtime in
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Figure 4.6. Performance of MEMICS for the Automotive Example: Runtime
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this chart is represented by the overall (red) curve. This curve is divided into
the two curves: icp (green) and unrolling (blue). The results show that the
overall time consumed by MEMICS increases superlinearly. Where the time
for unrolling increases linearly and is quite small, the time spent on icp also
increases superlinearly. As aforementioned in Chapter 3, the solver spends most
of its time on icp. The remaining parts used in MEMICS are so small time-wise,
that they are not shown here.
The memory consumption of MEMICS, in contrast to the runtime, is increas-
ing linearly. The reason therefore is that from benchmark to benchmark exactly
one run of the Laplace operator is added, which therefore already is linear.
4.3 Results
The tests presented in this chapter have shown that MEMICS is running reliably.
In addition it has been shown that MEMICS is able to correctly identify the
runtime errors presented in Table 2.3. Even on benchmarks, where MEMICS has
to run for over one hour, it does not segfault and still obtains the correct result.
Although the results also show that MEMICS can be used on industrial software,
its overall performance regarding runtime will not be very good. On the other
hand, since MEMICS is still limited to the state explosion problem – like any
other formal verification tool – it will require the latest hardware in terms of
physical memory and CPU technology.
Concurrency Issues from SV-Comp13 There exists a category called concur-
rency issues at the SV-Comp13, although all provided test cases are implemented
on the base of POSIX Threads (pthreads) [91]. In an early version of MEMICS,
which was used to retrieve the result published in [84], pthreads have been prop-
erly implemented and were working. But, due to a major rework of MEMICS,
the current implementation does not feature pthreads. On the other hand, the
verification goal for the concurrency benchmarks, again, is the reachability of
the label “ERROR” without taking care about any possible race condition. Hence,
even if MEMICS would support pthreads, it will in most of the cases straight
forwardly identify a race condition and therefore not reach the requested error
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location.
The aforementioned state explosion problem is inherent to formal verifi-
cation tools. A possible trade-off therefore is the combination of “fast” tools
using approximate techniques and “slow” tools providing very precise results.
In the following Chapter such combinations are introduced and it shows how
MEMICS can be used in an industrial tool chain to obtain the best and most
precise results.
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Chapter 5
Workflow
An example for the current process of static software analysis in the automotive
domain, as recommended by the ISO 26262, is shown in Figure 5.1. In this
Expert Postprocessing Analysis Manual Review
Static Single
 Analysis
Race 
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BauhausAstrée Polyspace
Approximative
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C/C++
Source
Code
Error
Candidates
Errors FalsePositive
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Figure 5.1. Example Process of Static Software Analysis in the Automotive Domain
process C/C++ source is analyzed by static software analysis tools like Astrée,
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Polyspace or many others, and e. g., the race detection tool Bauhaus. As stated in
Chapter 2, these tools are able to handle large amounts of source code, because
all of them work with approximative techniques. However, they all suffer from
imprecision in their results. Therefore, the output of these tools includes two
categories:
1. Runtime errors the tool can explicitly identify, and
2. Error candidates, where the tool can not decide, if the error holds or not.
The number of error candidates can be very large, especially in terms of con-
current errors. The reason for that is based on the fact that each possible pair
of read-write or write-write correlations is reported as a race condition. There-
fore, it is obvious that this number can be huge in terms of industrial software
consisting of up to several million lines of code.
In order to filter the error candidates into real runtime errors and false
positives, a manual review is required. This review has to be made by an expert
in C/C++ source code, and is in most of the cases very expensive in terms of
time. Therefore, the reviewer usually only checks those errors with the highest
severity for risk of failure. When it comes to the manual review of concurrent
runtime errors, it is much more difficult to decide whether an error candidate is
a real error or just a false positive.
In the following section, the combination of industrial tools with the MEMICS
software verification tool is introduced.
5.1 Tool-Chain of Static Software Analysis Tools
The tool-chain in which MEMICS can be embedded is shown in Figure 5.2. In
this workflow MEMICS is used to verify, which of the error candidates are real
errors and which are false positives. There exist several possible scenarios on
the combination of static software analysis tools, since in general there exist
many more tools in the approximative category. In the following, two scenarios,
representing each category, are introduced and discussed in detail: in Section 5.2
the combination of MEMICS and Polyspace and in Section 5.3 the combination
of Bauhaus and MEMICS.
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Figure 5.2. The new Workflow – Using MEMICS as the Postprocessing Engine
5.2 Combination: MEMICSØ Polyspace
The general result of a Polyspace analysis is divided into 5 different groups:
green, red, orange, grey and purple. The green group contains good code and
the red identified runtime errors. In the orange group the unproven errors are
gathered. The grey group contains dead or unreachable code and the purple
group indicates code rule violations. Hence, the most critical group is the orange
one – the error candidates –, since Polyspace is not able to verify its content.
Let’s assume Polyspace identifies a potential division by zero in line 34 of file
A, where the dividend is x. In general a manual reviewer has to decide whether
x can really be equal to zero at that certain point or not. But, one can also use
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MEMICS to retrieve that information. The relevant target question MEMICS
requires to verify the property looks like:
loc = PC(A:34) ^ reg(loc:x) = 0
With the help of the MEMICS internal mapping between input source code
and the MEMICS model, the pattern PC(filename:linenumber) computes the
actual program counter for the relevant assembly instruction. In addition the
pattern reg(location:variable) retrieves the corresponding register for the
current variable – also using the same map. The solver then has to checked
whether there exists any path leading to the location of the variable x and if the
corresponding register contains the value 0.
5.3 Combination: BauhausØMEMICS
In the combination of Bauhaus and MEMICS two scenarios have to be consid-
ered. In the first case MEMICS is used to check, which of the detected race pairs
are valid in the current system, or not. Such a race pair is in general defined
by the access to one global resource from two different tasks A and B. The con-
flicting access can either be of type: read/write or write/write. It is possible that
depending on the level of approximation Bauhaus can not determine the exact
source location for those two accesses. In such a case, a manual review can be
really hard and even almost impossible, since there may exist more than one
access to the conflicting resource from both tasks. Hence, a tool like MEMICS is
required to analyze such problems.
Let’s assume Bauhaus detected a race pair between the two tasks A and B for
the global resource x. The target question for MEMICS in order to verify the
property is defined as:
clk(load, A, x) > clk(write, B, x)
With this information, MEMICS searches for all read access from task A as well as
all write access from task B to the resource x and checks, if for one pair out of all
interleavings the read access occurs after the write access. In case Bauhaus can
determine the source location of the two conflicting accesses, then the relevant
search space for MEMICS can be reduced considerably. The corresponding target
question is defined as:
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clk(load, A, x, PC(locA)) > clk(write, B, x, PC(locB))
The second scenario of a combination between Bauhaus and MEMICS is not
actually covered by the workflow description in Figure 5.2. It is rather an interac-
tion between both tools, in which Bauhaus uses MEMICS to check, whether a
schedule of tasks is valid or not. Let’s assume Bauhaus requires the information,
if the C statement at file D in line x used from task A and the statement at file E in
line y used from task B can occur concurrently under the given scheduling rules
in the current system. The target question for MEMICS to check this property is
defined as:
clk(PC(D:x), A) == clk(PC(E:y), B).
5.4 Results
This chapter has introduced the idea that embedding MEMICS into a tool-chain
with industrial static software analysis tools, reduces the effort for expensive
manual reviews. On the other hand MEMICS also benefits from these scenarios.
As aforementioned in Chapter 4, MEMICS is like any other formal verification
tool limited by the state explosion problem. It is therefore possible that MEMICS
is not able to detect all the errors identified by the industrial tools on its own. The
search for a specific target, only, has almost the same impact as program slicing.
In this case the search space is reduced, to those paths leading to the required
target, only. Such a possible reduction is shown in Figure 5.3. Depending on the
Entire Searchspace
Target
specific 
Slice
Figure 5.3. MEMICS IR Slice: Search-space Reduction for a specific Target
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location of the target, the factor reducing the search space can in some cases be
so large that it avoids the state explosion problem.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion & Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
The challenge of this thesis was the verification of concurrent embedded soft-
ware – in particular in the automotive domain. For this reason, the Memory
Interval Constraint Solving (MEMICS) software verification approach has been
developed as introduced in Chapter 3. MEMICS transforms the input C/C++
source code into the intermediate representation (IR), which is based on the
MIPS assembly language. Hence, MEMICS is not working based on any high-level
language abstraction. Instead, it uses low-level instructions like those occurring
in a real machine. If the system to be checked is an automotive system based on
AUTOSAR/OSEK the corresponding system configuration has to be given. In the
next step, MEMICS is checking the IR for any kind of runtime error covered in
Table 2.3. If MEMICS detects an error, it can return a detailed trace leading to
the exact error location.
The implementation of MEMICS has been tested against several others in
Chapter 4. The results have shown that the current proof-of-concept imple-
mentation of MEMICS is running in a very stable manner and is able to verify
systems in the automotive domain. Nevertheless, MEMICS is – like any other for-
mal verification approach – limited by the state explosion problem. In Chapter 5
a limitation of this problem has been described. For this purpose, MEMICS has
been embedded into a tool-chain with industrial static software analysis tools.
In this chain, MEMICS is used to filter the error candidates – produced by the
other tools – into real errors (including a trace to the error) and false positives.
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6.2 Future Work
Though, the current work is already very promising, there exist several visions
on future work, which could improve the overall performance of MEMICS. These
ideas include e. g., the embedding of the CEGAR technique introduced in [54].
With the help of this technique it is possible to create a pre-processing engine
for MEMICS, which uses forward- and backward-analysis in order to transfer
only the relevant paths for a specific target to MEMICS.
On the other hand it would be very useful, instead of using another tool –
e. g., Bauhaus – to gather possible race pairs, to have an embedded frontend
dealing with this task. Since MEMICS is already using the LLVM environment,
which contains all the relevant information on access to global resources, it
could be a moderate effort to implement such an engine.
The third and most generic idea is the MEMICS Module Kit. The current
implementation of MEMICS features one verification backend, the internal in-
terval constraint solver, which has been introduced in Section 3.4. The backend
is already working well according to the test results from Chapter 4. However, for
some analysis types or pre-processing engines as introduced in the ideas above,
it is possible that other SMT-Solvers using another theory could be more effi-
cient. For this purpose, the current implementation of the MEMICS Model is as
generic as possible. This allows the unrolling procedure to be easily adapted to a
various number of SMT theories, which therefore extends MEMICS to almost
any available SMT-Solver.
This variability can be very useful, in order to implement pre- and post-
processing engines for MEMICS, including e. g., the CEGAR idea from above.
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Appendix A
The MEMICS Model for the
Automotive Example 2.3.1
Listing A.1. The MEMICS Model for the Function readSensor from Example 2.3.1 in
Chapter 2 
1 PC = 22 -> PC’ = 23;
2 PC = 23 -> PC’ = 24;
3 PC = 24 -> sp_reg’ = sp_reg +U 4294967280 AND PC’ = 25;
4 PC = 25 -> sw(4_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 12), _clk_) AND PC’ = 26;
5 PC = 26 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 8), _clk_) AND PC’ = 27;
6 PC = 27 -> sw(4_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 4), _clk_) AND PC’ = 28;
7 PC = 28 -> sp_reg’ = sp_reg +U 16 AND resetMem(sp_reg, 16) AND
8 PC’ = 29;
9 PC = 29 -> PC’ = ra_reg;
10 PC = 30 -> PC’ = 31; 
Listing A.2. The MEMICS Model for the Function left from Example 2.3.1 in Chapter 2 
1 PC = 31 -> PC’ = 32;
2 PC = 32 -> PC’ = 33;
3 PC = 33 -> sp_reg’ = sp_reg +U 4294967280 AND PC’ = 34;
4 PC = 34 -> sw(4_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 12), _clk_) AND PC’ = 35;
5 PC = 35 -> sw(5_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 8), _clk_) AND PC’ = 36;
6 PC = 36 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 12), _clk_) AND PC’ = 37;
7 PC = 37 -> 2_reg’ = 2_reg +U 5_reg AND PC’ = 38;
8 PC = 38 -> 2_reg’ = 2_reg +U 4294967295 AND PC’ = 39;
9 PC = 39 -> 3_reg’ = 0 +U 5_reg AND PC’ = 40;
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10 PC = 40 -> lo_reg’ = 2_reg / 5_reg AND hi_reg’ = 2_reg % 5_reg
11 AND PC’ = 41;
12 PC = 41 -> 2_reg’ = hi_reg AND PC’ = 42;
13 PC = 42 -> sw(4_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 4), _clk_) AND PC’ = 43;
14 PC = 43 -> sw(3_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 44;
15 PC = 44 -> sp_reg’ = sp_reg +U 16 AND resetMem(sp_reg, 16) AND
16 PC’ = 45;
17 PC = 45 -> PC’ = ra_reg;
18 PC = 46 -> PC’ = 47; 
Listing A.3. The MEMICS Model for the Function right from Example 2.3.1 in Chapter 2 
1 PC = 47 -> PC’ = 48;
2 PC = 48 -> PC’ = 49;
3 PC = 49 -> sp_reg’ = sp_reg +U 4294967280 AND PC’ = 50;
4 PC = 50 -> sw(4_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 12), _clk_) AND PC’ = 51;
5 PC = 51 -> sw(5_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 8), _clk_) AND PC’ = 52;
6 PC = 52 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 12), _clk_) AND PC’ = 53;
7 PC = 53 -> 2_reg’ = 2_reg +U 1 AND PC’ = 54;
8 PC = 54 -> 3_reg’ = 0 +U 5_reg AND PC’ = 55;
9 PC = 55 -> lo_reg’ = 2_reg / 5_reg AND hi_reg’ = 2_reg % 5_reg
10 AND PC’ = 56;
11 PC = 56 -> 2_reg’ = hi_reg AND PC’ = 57;
12 PC = 57 -> sw(4_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 4), _clk_) AND PC’ = 58;
13 PC = 58 -> sw(3_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 59;
14 PC = 59 -> sp_reg’ = sp_reg +U 16 AND resetMem(sp_reg, 16) AND
15 PC’ = 60;
16 PC = 60 -> PC’ = ra_reg;
17 PC = 61 -> PC’ = 62; 
Listing A.4. The MEMICS Model for the Function readInputs from Example 2.3.1 in
Chapter 2 
1 PC = 62 -> PC’ = 63;
2 PC = 63 -> PC’ = 64;
3 PC = 64 -> sp_reg’ = sp_reg +U 4294967272 AND PC’ = 65;
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4 PC = 65 -> sw(ra_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 20), _clk_) AND PC’ = 66;
5 PC = 66 -> 2_reg’ = gp_reg +U getGlobalIndex(data1Ready) AND
6 PC’ = 67;
7 PC = 67 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(2_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 68;
8 PC = 68 -> ra_reg’ = 70 AND PC’ = 1;
9 PC = 69 -> PC’ = 70;
10 PC = 70 -> 2_reg’ = gp_reg +U getGlobalIndex(data2Ready) AND
11 PC’ = 71;
12 PC = 71 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(2_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 72;
13 PC = 72 -> ra_reg’ = 74 AND PC’ = 1;
14 PC = 73 -> PC’ = 74;
15 PC = 74 -> sw(0, memAdr(sp_reg, 16), _clk_) AND PC’ = 75;
16 PC = 75 -> 2_reg’ = 0 +U 1 AND PC’ = 76;
17 PC = 76 -> lw(3_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 16), _clk_) AND PC’ = 77;
18 PC = 77 -> 2_reg’ = 2_reg < 3_reg AND PC’ = 78;
19 PC = 78 AND 2_reg != 0 -> PC’ = 96;
20 PC = 79 -> PC’ = 80;
21 PC = 80 -> PC’ = 82;
22 PC = 81 -> PC’ = 82;
23 PC = 82 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 16), _clk_) AND PC’ = 83;
24 PC = 83 -> ra_reg’ = 85 AND PC’ = 22;
25 PC = 84 -> PC’ = 85;
26 PC = 85 -> 4_reg’ = gp_reg +U getGlobalIndex(sensors) AND
27 PC’ = 86;
28 PC = 86 -> lw(3_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 16), _clk_) AND PC’ = 87;
29 PC = 87 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(4_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 88;
30 PC = 88 -> 3_reg’ = 3_reg << 2 AND PC’ = 89;
31 PC = 89 -> 3_reg’ = 4_reg +U 3_reg AND PC’ = 90;
32 PC = 90 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(3_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 91;
33 PC = 91 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 16), _clk_) AND PC’ = 92;
34 PC = 92 -> 2_reg’ = 2_reg +U 1 AND PC’ = 93;
35 PC = 93 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 16), _clk_) AND PC’ = 94;
36 PC = 94 -> PC’ = 75;
37 PC = 95 -> PC’ = 96;
38 PC = 96 -> 2_reg’ = gp_reg +U getGlobalIndex(data1Ready) AND
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39 PC’ = 97;
40 PC = 97 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(2_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 98;
41 PC = 98 -> ra_reg’ = 100 AND PC’ = 11;
42 PC = 99 -> PC’ = 100;
43 PC = 100 -> 2_reg’ = 0 +U 3 AND PC’ = 101;
44 PC = 101 -> lw(3_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 16), _clk_) AND PC’ = 102;
45 PC = 102 -> 2_reg’ = 2_reg < 3_reg AND PC’ = 103;
46 PC = 103 AND 2_reg != 0 -> PC’ = 121;
47 PC = 104 -> PC’ = 105;
48 PC = 105 -> PC’ = 107;
49 PC = 106 -> PC’ = 107;
50 PC = 107 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 16), _clk_) AND PC’ = 108;
51 PC = 108 -> ra_reg’ = 110 AND PC’ = 22;
52 PC = 109 -> PC’ = 110;
53 PC = 110 -> 4_reg’ = gp_reg +U getGlobalIndex(sensors) AND
54 PC’ = 111;
55 PC = 111 -> lw(3_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 16), _clk_) AND PC’ = 112;
56 PC = 112 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(4_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 113;
57 PC = 113 -> 3_reg’ = 3_reg << 2 AND PC’ = 114;
58 PC = 114 -> 3_reg’ = 4_reg +U 3_reg AND PC’ = 115;
59 PC = 115 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(3_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 116;
60 PC = 116 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 16), _clk_) AND PC’ = 117;
61 PC = 117 -> 2_reg’ = 2_reg +U 1 AND PC’ = 118;
62 PC = 118 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 16), _clk_) AND PC’ = 119;
63 PC = 119 -> PC’ = 100;
64 PC = 120 -> PC’ = 121;
65 PC = 121 -> 2_reg’ = gp_reg +U getGlobalIndex(data2Ready) AND
66 PC’ = 122;
67 PC = 122 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(2_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 123;
68 PC = 123 -> ra_reg’ = 125 AND PC’ = 11;
69 PC = 124 -> PC’ = 125;
70 PC = 125 -> lw(ra_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 20), _clk_) AND
71 PC’ = 126;
72 PC = 126 -> sp_reg’ = sp_reg +U 24 AND resetMem(sp_reg, 24) AND
73 PC’ = 127;
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74 PC = 127 -> PC’ = ra_reg;
75 PC = 128 -> PC’ = 129; 
Listing A.5. The MEMICS Model for the Function writeOutputs from Example 2.3.1 in
Chapter 2 
1 PC = 129 -> PC’ = 130;
2 PC = 130 -> PC’ = 131;
3 PC = 131 -> sp_reg’ = sp_reg +U 4294967256 AND PC’ = 132;
4 PC = 132 -> sw(ra_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 36), _clk_) AND PC’ = 133;
5 PC = 133 -> 2_reg’ = gp_reg +U getGlobalIndex(worker1Ready) AND
6 PC’ = 134;
7 PC = 134 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(2_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 135;
8 PC = 135 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(2_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 136;
9 PC = 136 -> 2_reg’ = gp_reg +U getGlobalIndex(worker2Ready) AND
10 PC’ = 137;
11 PC = 137 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(2_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 138;
12 PC = 138 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 28), _clk_) AND PC’ = 139;
13 PC = 139 AND waitOnEvent(worker1Ready)-> PC’ = 140;
14 PC = 140 -> PC’ = 141;
15 PC = 141 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 28), _clk_) AND PC’ = 142;
16 PC = 142 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(4_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 143;
17 PC = 143 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 24), _clk_) AND PC’ = 144;
18 PC = 144 AND waitOnEvent(worker2Ready)-> PC’ = 145;
19 PC = 145 -> PC’ = 146;
20 PC = 146 -> sw(0, memAdr(sp_reg, 32), _clk_) AND PC’ = 147;
21 PC = 147 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 20), _clk_) AND PC’ = 148;
22 PC = 148 -> 2_reg’ = 0 +U 3 AND PC’ = 149;
23 PC = 149 -> lw(3_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 32), _clk_) AND PC’ = 150;
24 PC = 150 -> 2_reg’ = 2_reg < 3_reg AND PC’ = 151;
25 PC = 151 AND 2_reg != 0 -> PC’ = 170;
26 PC = 152 -> PC’ = 153;
27 PC = 153 -> PC’ = 155;
28 PC = 154 -> PC’ = 155;
29 PC = 155 -> 2_reg’ = gp_reg +U getGlobalIndex(tmp) AND
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30 PC’ = 156;
31 PC = 156 -> lw(3_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 32), _clk_) AND PC’ = 157;
32 PC = 157 -> 4_reg’ = gp_reg +U getGlobalIndex(actors) AND
33 PC’ = 158;
34 PC = 158 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(2_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 159;
35 PC = 159 -> 3_reg’ = 3_reg << 2 AND PC’ = 160;
36 PC = 160 -> 2_reg’ = 2_reg +U 3_reg AND PC’ = 161;
37 PC = 161 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(4_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 162;
38 PC = 162 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(2_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 163;
39 PC = 163 -> 3_reg’ = 4_reg +U 3_reg AND PC’ = 164;
40 PC = 164 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(3_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 165;
41 PC = 165 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 32), _clk_) AND PC’ = 166;
42 PC = 166 -> 2_reg’ = 2_reg +U 1 AND PC’ = 167;
43 PC = 167 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 32), _clk_) AND PC’ = 168;
44 PC = 168 -> PC’ = 148;
45 PC = 169 -> PC’ = 170;
46 PC = 170 -> lw(ra_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 36), _clk_) AND
47 PC’ = 171;
48 PC = 171 -> sp_reg’ = sp_reg +U 40 AND resetMem(sp_reg, 40) AND
49 PC’ = 172;
50 PC = 172 -> PC’ = ra_reg;
51 PC = 173 -> PC’ = 174; 
Listing A.6. The MEMICS Model for the Function worker1 from Example 2.3.1 in Chap-
ter 2 
1 PC = 174 -> PC’ = 175;
2 PC = 175 -> PC’ = 176;
3 PC = 176 -> sp_reg’ = sp_reg +U 4294967240 AND PC’ = 177;
4 PC = 177 -> sw(ra_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 52), _clk_) AND PC’ = 178;
5 PC = 178 -> 2_reg’ = gp_reg +U getGlobalIndex(worker1Ready) AND
6 PC’ = 179;
7 PC = 179 -> 3_reg’ = gp_reg +U getGlobalIndex(data1Ready) AND
8 PC’ = 180;
9 PC = 180 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(2_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 181;
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10 PC = 181 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(3_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 182;
11 PC = 182 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 40), _clk_) AND PC’ = 183;
12 PC = 183 -> ra_reg’ = 185 AND PC’ = 1;
13 PC = 184 -> PC’ = 185;
14 PC = 185 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 40), _clk_) AND PC’ = 186;
15 PC = 186 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(2_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 187;
16 PC = 187 AND waitOnEvent(data1Ready)-> PC’ = 188;
17 PC = 188 -> PC’ = 189;
18 PC = 189 -> 3_reg’ = 0 +U 2 AND PC’ = 190;
19 PC = 190 -> sw(0, memAdr(sp_reg, 48), _clk_) AND PC’ = 191;
20 PC = 191 -> sw(3_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 44), _clk_) AND PC’ = 192;
21 PC = 192 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 36), _clk_) AND PC’ = 193;
22 PC = 193 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 48), _clk_) AND PC’ = 194;
23 PC = 194 -> lw(3_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 44), _clk_) AND PC’ = 195;
24 PC = 195 -> 2_reg’ = 2_reg < 3_reg AND PC’ = 196;
25 PC = 196 AND 2_reg == 0 -> PC’ = 242;
26 PC = 197 -> PC’ = 198;
27 PC = 198 -> PC’ = 200;
28 PC = 199 -> PC’ = 200;
29 PC = 200 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 48), _clk_) AND PC’ = 201;
30 PC = 201 -> 2_reg’ = 0 +U 4 AND PC’ = 202;
31 PC = 202 -> 5_reg’ = 0 +U 2_reg AND PC’ = 203;
32 PC = 203 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 32), _clk_) AND PC’ = 204;
33 PC = 204 -> ra_reg’ = 206 AND PC’ = 31;
34 PC = 205 -> PC’ = 206;
35 PC = 206 -> 4_reg’ = gp_reg +U getGlobalIndex(sensors) AND
36 PC’ = 207;
37 PC = 207 -> lw(5_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 48), _clk_) AND PC’ = 208;
38 PC = 208 -> 2_reg’ = 2_reg << 2 AND PC’ = 209;
39 PC = 209 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(4_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 210;
40 PC = 210 -> 3_reg’ = 5_reg << 2 AND PC’ = 211;
41 PC = 211 -> 2_reg’ = 4_reg +U 2_reg AND PC’ = 212;
42 PC = 212 -> 3_reg’ = 4_reg +U 3_reg AND PC’ = 213;
43 PC = 213 -> lw(3_reg’, memAdr(3_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 214;
44 PC = 214 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(2_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 215;
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45 PC = 215 -> sw(4_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 28), _clk_) AND PC’ = 216;
46 PC = 216 -> 4_reg’ = 0 +U 5_reg AND PC’ = 217;
47 PC = 217 -> lw(5_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 32), _clk_) AND PC’ = 218;
48 PC = 218 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 24), _clk_) AND PC’ = 219;
49 PC = 219 -> sw(3_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 20), _clk_) AND PC’ = 220;
50 PC = 220 -> ra_reg’ = 222 AND PC’ = 47;
51 PC = 221 -> PC’ = 222;
52 PC = 222 -> 2_reg’ = 2_reg << 2 AND PC’ = 223;
53 PC = 223 -> lw(3_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 20), _clk_) AND PC’ = 224;
54 PC = 224 -> 3_reg’ = 3_reg << 1 AND PC’ = 225;
55 PC = 225 -> 4_reg’ = gp_reg +U getGlobalIndex(tmp) AND
56 PC’ = 226;
57 PC = 226 -> lw(5_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 28), _clk_) AND PC’ = 227;
58 PC = 227 -> 2_reg’ = 5_reg +U 2_reg AND PC’ = 228;
59 PC = 228 -> lw(6_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 48), _clk_) AND PC’ = 229;
60 PC = 229 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(2_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 230;
61 PC = 230 -> lw(7_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 24), _clk_) AND PC’ = 231;
62 PC = 231 -> 3_reg’ = 7_reg -U 3_reg AND PC’ = 232;
63 PC = 232 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(4_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 233;
64 PC = 233 -> 6_reg’ = 6_reg << 2 AND PC’ = 234;
65 PC = 234 -> 2_reg’ = 3_reg +U 2_reg AND PC’ = 235;
66 PC = 235 -> 3_reg’ = 4_reg +U 6_reg AND PC’ = 236;
67 PC = 236 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(3_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 237;
68 PC = 237 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 48), _clk_) AND PC’ = 238;
69 PC = 238 -> 2_reg’ = 2_reg +U 1 AND PC’ = 239;
70 PC = 239 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 48), _clk_) AND PC’ = 240;
71 PC = 240 -> PC’ = 193;
72 PC = 241 -> PC’ = 242;
73 PC = 242 -> 2_reg’ = gp_reg +U getGlobalIndex(worker1Ready) AND
74 PC’ = 243;
75 PC = 243 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(2_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 244;
76 PC = 244 -> ra_reg’ = 246 AND PC’ = 11;
77 PC = 245 -> PC’ = 246;
78 PC = 246 -> lw(ra_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 52), _clk_) AND
79 PC’ = 247;
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80 PC = 247 -> sp_reg’ = sp_reg +U 56 AND resetMem(sp_reg, 56) AND
81 PC’ = 248;
82 PC = 248 -> PC’ = ra_reg;
83 PC = 249 -> PC’ = 250; 
Listing A.7. The MEMICS Model for the Function worker2 from Example 2.3.1 in Chap-
ter 2 
1 PC = 250 -> PC’ = 251;
2 PC = 251 -> PC’ = 252;
3 PC = 252 -> sp_reg’ = sp_reg +U 4294967240 AND PC’ = 253;
4 PC = 253 -> sw(ra_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 52), _clk_) AND PC’ = 254;
5 PC = 254 -> 2_reg’ = gp_reg +U getGlobalIndex(worker2Ready) AND
6 PC’ = 255;
7 PC = 255 -> 3_reg’ = gp_reg +U getGlobalIndex(data2Ready) AND
8 PC’ = 256;
9 PC = 256 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(2_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 257;
10 PC = 257 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(3_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 258;
11 PC = 258 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 44), _clk_) AND PC’ = 259;
12 PC = 259 -> ra_reg’ = 261 AND PC’ = 1;
13 PC = 260 -> PC’ = 261;
14 PC = 261 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 44), _clk_) AND PC’ = 262;
15 PC = 262 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(2_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 263;
16 PC = 263 -> 2_reg’ = 0 +U 2 AND PC’ = 264;
17 PC = 264 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 40), _clk_) AND PC’ = 265;
18 PC = 265 AND waitOnEvent(data2Ready)-> PC’ = 266;
19 PC = 266 -> PC’ = 267;
20 PC = 267 -> lw(3_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 40), _clk_) AND PC’ = 268;
21 PC = 268 -> sw(3_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 48), _clk_) AND PC’ = 269;
22 PC = 269 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 36), _clk_) AND PC’ = 270;
23 PC = 270 -> 2_reg’ = 0 +U 3 AND PC’ = 271;
24 PC = 271 -> lw(3_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 48), _clk_) AND PC’ = 272;
25 PC = 272 -> 2_reg’ = 2_reg < 3_reg AND PC’ = 273;
26 PC = 273 AND 2_reg != 0 -> PC’ = 319;
27 PC = 274 -> PC’ = 275;
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28 PC = 275 -> PC’ = 277;
29 PC = 276 -> PC’ = 277;
30 PC = 277 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 48), _clk_) AND PC’ = 278;
31 PC = 278 -> 2_reg’ = 0 +U 4 AND PC’ = 279;
32 PC = 279 -> 5_reg’ = 0 +U 2_reg AND PC’ = 280;
33 PC = 280 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 32), _clk_) AND PC’ = 281;
34 PC = 281 -> ra_reg’ = 283 AND PC’ = 31;
35 PC = 282 -> PC’ = 283;
36 PC = 283 -> 4_reg’ = gp_reg +U getGlobalIndex(sensors) AND
37 PC’ = 284;
38 PC = 284 -> lw(5_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 48), _clk_) AND PC’ = 285;
39 PC = 285 -> 2_reg’ = 2_reg << 2 AND PC’ = 286;
40 PC = 286 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(4_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 287;
41 PC = 287 -> 3_reg’ = 5_reg << 2 AND PC’ = 288;
42 PC = 288 -> 2_reg’ = 4_reg +U 2_reg AND PC’ = 289;
43 PC = 289 -> 3_reg’ = 4_reg +U 3_reg AND PC’ = 290;
44 PC = 290 -> lw(3_reg’, memAdr(3_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 291;
45 PC = 291 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(2_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 292;
46 PC = 292 -> sw(4_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 28), _clk_) AND PC’ = 293;
47 PC = 293 -> 4_reg’ = 0 +U 5_reg AND PC’ = 294;
48 PC = 294 -> lw(5_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 32), _clk_) AND PC’ = 295;
49 PC = 295 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 24), _clk_) AND PC’ = 296;
50 PC = 296 -> sw(3_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 20), _clk_) AND PC’ = 297;
51 PC = 297 -> ra_reg’ = 299 AND PC’ = 47;
52 PC = 298 -> PC’ = 299;
53 PC = 299 -> 2_reg’ = 2_reg << 2 AND PC’ = 300;
54 PC = 300 -> lw(3_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 20), _clk_) AND PC’ = 301;
55 PC = 301 -> 3_reg’ = 3_reg << 1 AND PC’ = 302;
56 PC = 302 -> 4_reg’ = gp_reg +U getGlobalIndex(tmp) AND
57 PC’ = 303;
58 PC = 303 -> lw(5_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 28), _clk_) AND PC’ = 304;
59 PC = 304 -> 2_reg’ = 5_reg +U 2_reg AND PC’ = 305;
60 PC = 305 -> lw(6_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 48), _clk_) AND PC’ = 306;
61 PC = 306 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(2_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 307;
62 PC = 307 -> lw(7_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 24), _clk_) AND PC’ = 308;
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63 PC = 308 -> 3_reg’ = 7_reg -U 3_reg AND PC’ = 309;
64 PC = 309 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(4_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 310;
65 PC = 310 -> 6_reg’ = 6_reg << 2 AND PC’ = 311;
66 PC = 311 -> 2_reg’ = 3_reg +U 2_reg AND PC’ = 312;
67 PC = 312 -> 3_reg’ = 4_reg +U 6_reg AND PC’ = 313;
68 PC = 313 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(3_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 314;
69 PC = 314 -> lw(2_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 48), _clk_) AND PC’ = 315;
70 PC = 315 -> 2_reg’ = 2_reg +U 1 AND PC’ = 316;
71 PC = 316 -> sw(2_reg, memAdr(sp_reg, 48), _clk_) AND PC’ = 317;
72 PC = 317 -> PC’ = 270;
73 PC = 318 -> PC’ = 319;
74 PC = 319 -> 2_reg’ = gp_reg +U getGlobalIndex(worker2Ready) AND
75 PC’ = 320;
76 PC = 320 -> lw(4_reg’, memAdr(2_reg, 0), _clk_) AND PC’ = 321;
77 PC = 321 -> ra_reg’ = 323 AND PC’ = 11;
78 PC = 322 -> PC’ = 323;
79 PC = 323 -> lw(ra_reg’, memAdr(sp_reg, 52), _clk_) AND
80 PC’ = 324;
81 PC = 324 -> sp_reg’ = sp_reg +U 56 AND resetMem(sp_reg, 56) AND
82 PC’ = 325;
83 PC = 325 -> PC’ = ra_reg;
84 PC = 326 -> PC’ = 327; 
119

Appendix B
The MEMICS Instruction Set
Table B.1. MEMICS Instruction Set: Floating Point Instructions
All Instructions in this Table are operating on Floating Point Registers.
Instruction Description
a1fp := fadd(bfp, cfp); The values of the registers bfp and cfp are added
and stored into the register afp.
a1fp := fsub(bfp, cfp); The values of the registers bfp and cfp are
subtracted and stored into the register afp.
a1fp := fmul(bfp, cfp); The values of the registers bfp and cfp are
multiplied and stored into the register afp.
a1fp := fdiv(bfp, cfp); The value of the register bfp is divided by the
value of the register cfp and the result is stored
into the register afp.
a1fp := fexp(bfp); The exponential function for the value of
register bfp is computed and stored into the
register afp.
a1fp := fpow(bfp, cfp); The power function of the value from register
bfp to the basis of the value in register cfp is
computed and stored into the register afp.
a1fp := flog(bfp); The logarithm of the value from register bfp is
computed and store in register afp.
a1fp := fsqrt(bfp); The square-root of the value in register bfp is
computed and stored in register afp.
a1fp := fnroot(bfp, cfp); The nth-root of the value in register bfp, where
n is defined by the value in register c, is
assigned to the register afp.
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a1fp := fabs(bfp); The absolute value of the value in register bfp is
assigned to the register afp.
a1fp := fmin(bfp, cfp); The minimum of the two values from register
bfp and cfp is assigned to the register afp.
a1fp := fmax(bfp, cfp); The maximum of the two values from register
bfp and cfp is assigned to the register afp.
a1fp := fcos(bfp); The cosine value of the value from register bfp is
stored into register afp.
a1fp := ftan(bfp); The sine value of the value from register bfp is
stored into register afp.
a1fp := fsin(bfp); The tangent value of the value from register bfp
is stored into register afp.
a1fp := farccos(bfp); The arc cosine value of the value from register
bfp is stored into register afp.
a1fp := farctan(bfp); The arc sine value of the value from register bfp
is stored into register afp.
a1fp := farcsin(bfp); The arc tangent value of the value from register
bfp is stored into register afp.
Table B.2. MEMICS Instruction Set: Unsigned Integer Instructions – Arithmetic
Instruction Description
a1 := addu(b, c); The values of the registers b and c are added and
stored into the register a.
a1 := subu(b, c); The values of the registers b and c are subtracted
and stored into the register a.
a1 := mulu(b, c); The values of the registers b and c are multiplied
and stored into the register a.
a1 := divu(b, c); The value of the registers b is divided by the value
of the register c and the result is stored into the
register a.
a1 := expu(b); The exponential function for the value of register b
is computed and stored into the register a.
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a1 := powu(b, c); The power function of the value from register b to
the basis of the value in register c is computed and
stored into the register a.
a1 := logu(b); The logarithm of the value from register b is
computed and store in register a.
a1 := sqrtu(b); The square-root of the value in register b is
computed and stored in register a.
a1 := nrootu(b, c); The nth-root of the value in register b, where n is
defined by the value in register c, is assigned to the
register a.
a1 := absu(b); The absolute value of the value in register b is
assigned to the register a.
a1 := minu(b, c); The minimum of the two values from register b and
c is assigned to the register a.
a1 := maxu(b, c); The maximum of the two values from register b and
c is assigned to the register a.
a1 := cosu(b); The cosine value of the value from register b is
stored into register a.
a1 := tanu(b); The sine value of the value from register b is stored
into register a.
a1 := sinu(b); The tangent value of the value from register b is
stored into register a.
a1 := arccosu(b); The arc cosine value of the value from register b is
stored into register a.
a1 := arctanu(b); The arc sine value of the value from register b is
stored into register a.
a1 := arcsinu(b); The arc tangent value of the value from register b is
stored into register a.
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